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Campaign spending limits, incumbent spending, and election outcomes

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  • Kevin Milligan
  • Marie Rekkas

Abstract

We study the impact of campaign spending limits for candidates in Canadian federal elections. We first demonstrate that spending limits are binding mostly for incumbent candidates. We then use this information to produce endogeneity-corrected estimates for the impact of incumbent spending on electoral vote shares. Furthermore, we examine the impact of spending limits on broader measures of electoral outcomes, finding that larger limits lead to less close elections, fewer candidates, and lower voter turnout.

Suggested Citation

  • Kevin Milligan & Marie Rekkas, 2008. "Campaign spending limits, incumbent spending, and election outcomes," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1351-1374, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:41:y:2008:i:4:p:1351-1374
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2008.00507.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Acuña-Duarte, Andrés A. & Campos, Pedro G. & León, Javier A. & Salazar, César A., 2024. "Tweeting to be a constitution-writer in Chile: Social media activity, public discourse, and electoral outcomes during pandemic times," Technology in Society, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    2. Eric Avis & Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan & Carlos Varjão, "undated". "Money and Politics: The Effects of Campaign Spending Limits on Political Competition and Incumbency Advantage," Textos para discussão 656, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil).
    3. Bombardini, Matilde & Trebbi, Francesco, 2011. "Votes or money? Theory and evidence from the US Congress," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7-8), pages 587-611, August.
    4. Abel François & Michael Visser & Lionel Wilner, 2022. "The petit effect of campaign spending on votes: using political financing reforms to measure spending impacts in multiparty elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 192(1), pages 29-57, July.
    5. William Pyle & Laura Solanko, 2013. "The composition and interests of Russia’s business lobbies: testing Olson’s hypothesis of the “encompassing organization”," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(1), pages 19-41, April.
    6. Pastine, Ivan & Pastine, Tuvana, 2012. "Incumbency advantage and political campaign spending limits," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 20-32.
    7. Jan Brueckner & Kangoh Lee, 2015. "Negative campaigning in a probabilistic voting model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(3), pages 379-399, September.
    8. Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2010. "Political campaign spending limits," Working Papers 201034, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
    9. Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira & Allan Drazen, 2024. "A Theory of Small Campaign Contributions," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 134(662), pages 2351-2390.
    10. Martin Grossmann & Helmut Dietl, 2012. "Asymmetric contests with liquidity constraints," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 691-713, March.
    11. Brandon Schaufele, 2013. "Dissent in Parliament as Reputation Building," Working Papers 1301E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
    12. Perez-Vincent, Santiago M., 2023. "A few signatures matter: Barriers to entry in Italian local politics," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    13. Wang, Ao, 2021. "A BLP Demand Model of Product-Level Market Shares with Complementarity," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1351, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    14. Abel François & Michael Visser & Lionel WILNER, 2016. "Campaign spending and legislative election outcomes: Exploiting the French political financing reforms of the mid-1990s," Working Papers 2016-28, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    15. Chad Kendall & Marie Rekkas, 2012. "Incumbency advantages in the Canadian Parliament," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1560-1585, November.
    16. Matthew T. Cole & Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2018. "Incumbency Advantage in an Electoral Contest," The Economic and Social Review, Economic and Social Studies, vol. 49(4), pages 419-436.

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