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Political Campaign Spending Limits

  • Ivan Pastine

    ()

    (University College Dublin)

  • Tuvana Pastine

    ()

    (Economics,Finance and Accounting National University of Ireland,)

Political campaign spending ceilings are purported to limit the incumbent’s ability to exploit his fundraising advantage. If the challenger does not have superior campaign effectiveness, in contrast to conventional wisdom, we show that the incumbent always benefits from a limit as long as he has an initial voter disposition advantage, however small and regardless of the candidates’ relative fundraising ability. If the challenger has higher campaign spending effectiveness, the effect of limits may be non-monotonic. If the incumbent enjoys a mild initial voter disposition advantage, a moderate limit benefits the challenger. Further restricting the limit favours the incumbent. Stricter limits may lead to the unintended consequence of increased expected spending.

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File URL: http://repec.maynoothuniversity.ie/mayecw-files/N213-10.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland - Maynooth in its series Economics, Finance and Accounting Department Working Paper Series with number n213-10.pdf.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:may:mayecw:n213-10.pdf
Contact details of provider: Postal: Maynooth, Co. Kildare
Phone: 353-1-7083728
Fax: 353-1-7083934
Web page: http://www.maynoothuniversity.ie/economics-finance-and-accounting

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  1. Prat, A., 1998. "Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters and Multiple Lobbies," Discussion Paper 1998-123, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Palda, Filip, 1992. "The Determinants of Campaign Spending: The Role of the Government Jackpot," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(4), pages 627-38, October.
  3. Kevin Milligan & Marie Rekkas, 2008. "Campaign spending limits, incumbent spending, and election outcomes," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1351-1374, November.
  4. Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2008. "Politician Preferences,Law-Abiding Lobbyists and Caps on Political Lobbying," Economics, Finance and Accounting Department Working Paper Series n1991208.pdf, Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.
  5. Nicolas Sahuguet & Nicola Persico, 2006. "Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 95-124, 05.
  6. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," Microeconomics 9809003, EconWPA.
  7. Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2010. "Politician preferences, law-abiding lobbyists and caps on political contributions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(1), pages 81-101, October.
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