Campaign Advertising and Election Outcomes: Quasi-Natural Experiment Evidence from Gubernatorial Elections in Brazil
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- Bernardo S. Da Silveira & João M. P. De Mello, 2011. "Campaign Advertising and Election Outcomes: Quasi-natural Experiment Evidence from Gubernatorial Elections in Brazil," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(2), pages 590-612.
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More about this item
KeywordsTV Advertising; Campaign Spending; Election Outcomes; Endogeneity; Quasi-Natural Experiments;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-09-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2007-09-30 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MAC-2007-09-30 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MKT-2007-09-30 (Marketing)
- NEP-POL-2007-09-30 (Positive Political Economics)
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