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The Determinants of Campaign Spending: The Role of the Government Jackpot

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  • Palda, Filip

Abstract

To raise money for their campaigns, political candidates auction a part of government wealth (the jackpot) to contributors. The larger the jackpot, the more candidates spend. Data on the gubernatorial races of 1978 and 1986 indicate that (1) for every dollar increase in the per capita jackpot, campaign spending rises by 0.0004 cents per voter; (2) balanced budget laws hinder the candidate's ability to raise money; and (3) in states that give the governor more power over the budget (measured by a "Schlesinger" index), candidates raise more. The paper emphasizes that candidates willingly limit their spending to avoid indebtedness to contributors. Copyright 1992 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Palda, Filip, 1992. "The Determinants of Campaign Spending: The Role of the Government Jackpot," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(4), pages 627-638, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:30:y:1992:i:4:p:627-38
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    Cited by:

    1. Gregory Randolph, 2011. "The voter initiative and the power of the governor: evidence from campaign expenditures," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 265-286, September.
    2. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
    3. Filip Palda, 2002. "Campaign Finance: An Introduction to the Field," Public Economics 0209005, EconWPA.
    4. Joaquín Artés & Enrique Viñuela, 2007. "Campaign spending and office-seeking motivations: an empirical analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 41-55, October.
    5. Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2010. "Political Campaign Spending Limits," Economics, Finance and Accounting Department Working Paper Series n213-10.pdf, Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.
    6. David R. Stockman, 2001. "Balanced-Budget Rules: Welfare Loss and Optimal Policies," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 4(2), pages 438-459, July.
    7. Pastine, Ivan & Pastine, Tuvana, 2012. "Incumbency advantage and political campaign spending limits," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 20-32.
    8. Filip Palda, 2001. "Election Finance Regulation in Emerging Democracies: Lessons from Canada and the U.S," Public Economics 0111010, EconWPA.
    9. repec:kap:pubcho:v:174:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-018-0504-x is not listed on IDEAS

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