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Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence

  • Potters, Jan
  • Sloof, Randolph

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 12 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
Pages: 403-442

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:12:y:1996:i:3:p:403-442
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