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The Effects of Logrolling on Congressional Voting

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  • Stratmann, Thomas

Abstract

The theoretical public-choice literature suggests that vote trading is an important determinant of congressional voting behavior. Yet empirical voting models do not allow for vote trading. These models recognize that observed ideology may influence legislative behavior but do not correct for unobserved ideology. This study devises new tests for logrolling and ideology. The empirical model controls for logroll agreements and unobserved ideological interest via the correlation of unobserved variables. The results reflect the presence of vote-trading coalitions on some votes but not on others. The results cast doubt on the importance of personal ideological interests of legislators. Copyright 1992 by American Economic Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Stratmann, Thomas, 1992. "The Effects of Logrolling on Congressional Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1162-1176, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:82:y:1992:i:5:p:1162-76
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    Cited by:

    1. Brian Knight, 2000. "The flypaper effect unstuck: evidence on endogenous grants from the Federal Highway Aid Program," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2000-49, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    2. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
    3. Christian Bredemeier, 2014. "Imperfect information and the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(3), pages 561-576, June.
    4. W. Reed & D. Schansberg & James Wilbanks & Zhen Zhu, 1998. "The relationship between congressional spending and tenure with an application to term limits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 85-104, January.
    5. A. Abigail Payne, 2003. "The Effects of Congressional Appropriation Committee Membership on the Distribution of Federal Research Funding to Universities," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 41(2), pages 325-345, April.
    6. Ilyana Kuziemko & Eric Werker, 2006. "How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(5), pages 905-930, October.
    7. Yogesh Uppal, 2010. "Estimating Incumbency Effects In U.S. State Legislatures: A Quasi-Experimental Study," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(2), pages 180-199, July.
    8. Shaun M. Tanger & Richard Alan Seals Jr. & David N. Laband, 2011. "Does Bill Co-sponsorship Affect Campaign Contributions?: Evidence from the U.S. House of Representatives, 2000-2008," Auburn Economics Working Paper Series auwp2011-09, Department of Economics, Auburn University.
    9. Gawande, Kishore & Hoekman, Bernard, 2006. "Lobbying and Agricultural Trade Policy in the United States," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(03), pages 527-561, July.
    10. Irwin, Douglas A. & Kroszner, Randall S., 1996. "Log-rolling and economic interests in the passage of the Smoot-Hawley tariff," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 173-200, December.
    11. repec:spr:grdene:v:10:y:2001:i:3:d:10.1023_a:1011262625052 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Urs Fischbacher & Simeon Schudy, 2014. "Reciprocity and resistance to comprehensive reform," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(3), pages 411-428, September.
    13. Seltzer, Andrew J, 1995. "The Political Economy of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1302-1342, December.
    14. Lehmann-Waffenschmidt, Marco & Reina, Livia, 2003. "Coalition formation in multilateral negotiations with a potential for logrolling: An experimental analysis of negotiators' cognition processes," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 17/03, Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
    15. Michael Reksulak & William Shughart, 2012. "What should government do? Problems of social cost, externalities and all that," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 103-114, July.
    16. B. Chupp, 2014. "Political interaction in the senate: estimating a political “spatial” weights matrix and an application to lobbying behavior," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(3), pages 521-538, September.
    17. Kenneth Koford, 1994. "What Can We Learn About Congressional Politics From Dimensional Studies Of Roll-Call Voting?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(2), pages 173-186, July.
    18. Jon X. Eguia, 2013. "The Origin of Parties: The United States Congress in 1789–1797 as a Test Case," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(3), pages 313-334, November.
    19. Jon Eguia, 2012. "A spatial theory of party formation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 49(3), pages 549-570, April.
    20. de Jong, Abe & van Dijk, Ronald & Veld, Chris, 2003. "The dividend and share repurchase policies of Canadian firms: empirical evidence based on an alternative research design," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 349-377.
    21. Jonathan Klick & Francesco Parisi, 2003. "The Disunity of Unanimity," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 83-94, June.
    22. Joseph Persky, 2001. "Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Classical Creed," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 199-208, Fall.
    23. Derek Gatherer, 2006. "Comparison of Eurovision Song Contest Simulation with Actual Results Reveals Shifting Patterns of Collusive Voting Alliances," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 9(2), pages 1-1.
    24. Crombez, Christophe, 2000. "Spatial models of logrolling in the European Union," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 707-737, November.

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