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Ideology, Voting, and Shirking

Author

Listed:
  • Kau, James B
  • Rubin, Paul H

Abstract

Since the authors first raised the issue in 1979, scholars have addressed two questions regarding ideology and congressional voting. Does ideology have an impact on such voting? Do representatives shirk by voting their own ideology rather than their constituents' interests? For the first question, it appears that there is a consensus that ideology does matter, although they present some confirming evidence for 1980. The second question has been confused; some think that ideology and shirking are identical, although they are logically separate categories. The authors show that even if ideological shirking exists, it is relatively unimportant. They also show that self interested (non-ideological) shirking exists. They conclude that research efforts to untangle constituents' and representatives' separate ideologies have been misguided and that further efforts to examine the determinants of constituent ideology should be pursued. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Kau, James B & Rubin, Paul H, 1993. "Ideology, Voting, and Shirking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 76(1-2), pages 151-172, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:76:y:1993:i:1-2:p:151-72
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dennis, Christopher & Bishin, Benjamin & Nicolaou, Politimy, 2000. "Constituent diversity and congress: the case of NAFTA," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 349-360, July.
    2. Dennis, Christopher, 1998. "Support for campaign spending limitations in the U. S. senate: The role of party, ideology and electoral security," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 641-649.
    3. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
    4. René Lindstädt & Ryan Wielen, 2011. "Timely shirking: time-dependent monitoring and its effects on legislative behavior in the U.S. Senate," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 119-148, July.
    5. Cohen, Lauren & Diether, Karl & Malloy, Christopher, 2013. "Legislating stock prices," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 574-595.
    6. J. R. Clark & Dwight R. Lee, 2003. "Trust in Government as a Constitutional Consequence," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 18(Spring 20), pages 1-21.
    7. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi & Francesco Trebbi, 2010. "The Political Economy of the US Mortgage Default Crisis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 1967-1998, December.
    8. Stanley L. Winer & Michael W. Tofias & Bernard Grofman & John H. Aldrich, 2007. "Is it Economics or Politics? Trending Economic Factors and the Structure of Congress in the Growth of Government, 1930-2002 – revised version: Trending Economic Factors and the Structure of Congress i," Carleton Economic Papers 07-04, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised 17 Jan 2008.
    9. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2008:i:25:p:1-11 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Kahn, Matthew E & Matsusaka, John G, 1997. "Demand for Environmental Goods: Evidence from Voting Patterns on California Initiatives," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(1), pages 137-173, April.
    11. Lauren Cohen & Karl B. Diether & Christopher Malloy, 2012. "Legislating Stock Prices," NBER Working Papers 18291, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Peter A. Zaleski & Penny Maier Donati, 2000. "Tort Reform Voting in the U.S. Senate," Public Finance Review, , vol. 28(5), pages 415-427, September.
    13. repec:spr:empeco:v:53:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s00181-016-1168-3 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Bronars, Stephen G & Lott, John R, Jr, 1997. "Do Campaign Donations Alter How a Politician Votes? Or, Do Donors Support Candidates Who Value the Same Things That They Do?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(2), pages 317-350, October.
    15. Dennis, Christopher & Medoff, Marshall H. & Magnera, Michael, 2008. "Constituents' economic interests and senator support for spending limitations," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 2443-2453, December.
    16. Robert Lowry, 1998. "Religion and the demand for membership in environmental citizen groups," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 223-240, March.
    17. François Facchini & Mickaël Melki, 2012. "Political Ideology and Economic Growth in a Democracy: The French Experience, 1871 - 2009," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 12003, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.

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