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Do legislators' votes reflect constituency preference? A simple way to evaluate the Senate

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  • Robert Higgs

Abstract

U.S. senators frequently vote against the preference of their constituency, assuming that such a preference exists. Both of a state's senators represent the same constituency. Whenever they split their votes, one or the other is necessarily going against the constituency preference. For the sample of defense-related votes analyzed above, “misrepresentation” — either observable vote splitting or unobservable vote matches that go against the constituency preference — occurred at least 37 percent of the time, at least 46 percent on one vote. Although party differences accounted for more than two-thirds of the vote splitting, a substantial number of splits remained. Besides, a party difference for a state's senatorial pair is itself problematical. The method employed here can be applied easily to any data whatever on senatorial voting. Its application will show that, quite often, many senators depart from constituency preference. This finding refutes the hypothesis, popular in certain circles, that ours is a more or less “perfect political market” with little or no scope for ideologically driven voting by legislators. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Higgs, 1989. "Do legislators' votes reflect constituency preference? A simple way to evaluate the Senate," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 175-181, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:63:y:1989:i:2:p:175-181
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00153399
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peltzman, Sam, 1984. "Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 181-210, April.
    2. Nelson, Douglas & Silberberg, Eugene, 1987. "Ideology and Legislator Shirking," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 25(1), pages 15-25, January.
    3. Kalt, Joseph P & Zupan, Mark A, 1984. "Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 279-300, June.
    4. Peltzman, Sam, 1985. "An Economic Interpretation of the History of Congressional Voting in the Twentieth Century," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 656-675, September.
    5. Poole, Keith T. & Daniels, R. Steven, 1985. "Ideology, Party, and Voting in the U.S. Congress, 1959–1980," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(2), pages 373-399, June.
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    6. Fredriksson, Per G. & Gaston, Noel, 1999. "The "greening" of trade unions and the demand for eco-taxes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 663-686, November.

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