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No Kin in the Game: Moral Hazard and War in the US Congress

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  • Eoin F. McGuirk
  • Nathaniel Hilger
  • Nicholas Miller

Abstract

We study agency frictions in the US Congress. We examine the long-standing hypothesis that political elites engage in conflict because they fail to internalize the associated costs. We compare the voting behavior of legislators with draft age sons versus draft age daughters during the conscription-era wars of the twentieth century. We estimate that having a draft age son reduces proconscription voting by 7–11 percentage points. Support for conscription recovers when a legislator’s son ages out of eligibility. We establish that agency problems contribute to political conflict and that politicians are influenced by private incentives orthogonal to political concerns or ideological preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Eoin F. McGuirk & Nathaniel Hilger & Nicholas Miller, 2023. "No Kin in the Game: Moral Hazard and War in the US Congress," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(9), pages 2370-2401.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/724316
    DOI: 10.1086/724316
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    3. Van Effenterre, Clémentine, 2017. "Papa Does Preach: Daughters and Polarisation of Attitudes toward Abortion," IZA Discussion Papers 11177, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

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    JEL classification:

    • N42 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-

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