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Political cheating

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  • John Lott

Abstract

This paper shows that how a politician votes is unrelated to whether he faces re-election. This contradicts the universal agreement by economists that political behavior is constrained by the threat of re-election. Contrary to the existing work on ideology, I show that ideology can prevent rather than cause opportunistic behavior. My discussion of ideology can explain why the last period does not affect how a politician votes but only how often he votes. Besides providing an explanation for how politicians can internalize the long-run returns to investments through ideology, my results show that political parties have no effect on how retiring congressmen vote. Finally, I shall try to argue that politicians are search and not experience goods. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987

Suggested Citation

  • John Lott, 1987. "Political cheating," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 169-186, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:52:y:1987:i:2:p:169-186
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00123875
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nelson, Phillip, 1976. "Political Information," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 315-336, August.
    2. Lott, John Jr., 1987. "The effect of nontransferable property rights on the efficiency of political markets : Some evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 231-246, March.
    3. Peltzman, Sam, 1984. "Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 181-210, April.
    4. Nelson, Phillip, 1970. "Information and Consumer Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 311-329, March-Apr.
    5. John Lott, 1986. "Brand names and barriers to entry in political markets," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 87-92, January.
    6. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
    7. Robert Barro, 1973. "The control of politicians: An economic model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 19-42, March.
    8. Kalt, Joseph P & Zupan, Mark A, 1984. "Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 279-300, June.
    9. Kau, James B & Rubin, Paul H, 1979. "Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 365-384, October.
    10. Telser, L G, 1980. "A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 27-44, January.
    11. Nelson, Philip, 1974. "Advertising as Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 729-754, July/Aug..
    12. Telser, Lester G, 1976. "Political Information: Comment," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 337-340, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Smart, Michael & Sturm, Daniel M., 2013. "Term limits and electoral accountability," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 93-102.
    2. John Lott & W. Reed, 1989. "Shirking and sorting in a political market with finite-lived politicians," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 75-96, April.
    3. Michael Davis & Philip Porter, 1989. "A test for pure or apparent ideology in congressional voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 60(2), pages 101-111, February.
    4. Bernecker, Andreas, 2014. "Do politicians shirk when reelection is certain? Evidence from the German parliament," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 55-70.
    5. Mansbridge, Jane, 2008. "A "Selection Model" of Political Representation," Working Paper Series rwp08-010, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    6. Alston, Lee J. & Jenkins, Jeffery A. & Nonnenmacher, Tomas, 2006. "Who Should Govern Congress? Access to Power and the Salary Grab of 1873," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 66(3), pages 674-706, September.
    7. Besley, Timothy & Larcinese, Valentino, 2005. "Working or shirking? A closer look at MPs’ expenses and parliamentary attendance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3609, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    8. John Lott, 1987. "The institutional arrangement of public education: The puzzle of exclusive territories," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 89-96, January.
    9. Gertrud Fremling & John Lott, 1988. "Televising legislatures: Some thoughts on whether politicians are search goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 73-78, July.
    10. J. Sebastian Leguizamon & George R. Crowley, 2016. "Term limits, time horizons and electoral accountability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(1), pages 23-42, July.
    11. Ernesto Dal Bó & Martín Rossi, 2008. "Term Length and Political Performance," NBER Working Papers 14511, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Bernecker, Andreas, 2013. "Do Politicians Shirk when Reelection Is Certain? Evidence from the German Parliament," Working Papers 13-09, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
    13. Thomas Braendle, 2015. "Does remuneration affect the discipline and the selection of politicians? Evidence from pay harmonization in the European Parliament," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(1), pages 1-24, January.

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