Who Should Govern Congress? Access to Power and the Salary Grab of 1873
We examine the politics of the %u201CSalary Grab%u201D of 1873, legislation that increased congressional salaries retroactively by 50 percent. A group of New England and Midwestern elites opposed the Salary Grab, along with congressional franking and patronage-based civil service appointments, as part of reform effort to reshape %u201Cwho should govern Congress.%u201D Our analyses of congressional voting confirm the existence of this non-party elite coalition. While these elites lost many legislative battles in the short-run, their efforts kept reform on the legislative agenda throughout the late-nineteenth century and ultimately set the stage for the Progressive movement in the early-twentieth century.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2005|
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|Publication status:||published as Alston, Lee J. & Jenkins, Jeffery A. & Nonnenmacher, Tomas, 2006. "Who Should Govern Congress? Access to Power and the Salary Grab of 1873," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 66(03), pages 674-706, September.|
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