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Restraining the Genuine Homo Economicus: Why the Economy Cannot Be Divorced from Its Governance

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  • Stergios Skaperdas

    () (University of California-Irvine)

Abstract

The Homo economicus of traditional economics is far from being completely self-interested, rational, or as individualistic as he is purported to be; he will haggle to death over price but will not take what he wants by force. Implicitly, he is assumed to behave ruthlessly within a well-defined bubble of sainthood. Based on a simple model, I first examine what occurs when this assumption is relaxed and genuine, amoral Homo economici interact. Productivity can be inversely related to compensation; a longer shadow of the future can intensify conflict; and more competition among providers of protection reduces welfare. The patently inefficient outcomes that follow call for restraining self-interest, for finding ways to govern markets. I then review some of the different ways of creating restraints, from the traditional social contract, to the hierarchical domination of kings and lords, to modern forms of governance. Checks and balances, wider representation, the bureaucratic form of organization, and other ingredients of modern governance can partly be thought of as providing restraints to the dark side of self-interest. Though highly imperfect, these restraints are better than the alternative, which typically involves autocratic, amateurish, and corrupt rule. Then, thinking of most problems in terms of a first-best economic model is practically and scientifically misguided. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003.

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  • Stergios Skaperdas, 2003. "Restraining the Genuine Homo Economicus: Why the Economy Cannot Be Divorced from Its Governance," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(2), pages 135-162, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:15:y:2003:i:2:p:135-162
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    1. Horatiu A. Rus, 2012. "Environmental Depletion, Governance, and Conflict," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 1305-1332, April.
    2. Lagerlöf, Nils-Petter, 2013. "Violence and property rights," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 312-328.
    3. Münster, Johannes, 2005. "Simultaneous inter- and intra-group conflicts
      [Simultane Konflikte innerhalb und zwischen Gruppen]
      ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2005-08, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    4. Helmut Bester & Kai A. Konrad, 2005. "Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 17(2), pages 199-215, April.
    5. Ashish Chaturvedi, 2005. "Rigging elections with violence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(1), pages 189-202, July.
    6. Konrad, Kai A., 2004. "Bidding in hierarchies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(6), pages 1301-1308, December.
    7. Soumyanetra Munshi, 2019. "Jaw–jaw and war–war: a game-theoretic exploration of violence in electoral politics," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 203-237, December.
    8. Antoine Pietri & Tarik Tazdait & Mehrdad Vahabi, 2013. "Empire-Building and Price Competition," Post-Print hal-00832236, HAL.
    9. Münster, Johannes, 2008. "Repeated contests with asymmetric information
      [Wiederholte Wettkämpfe mit asymmetrischer Information]
      ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2008-08, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
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    12. Münster, Johannes, 2004. "Simultaneous inter- and intra-group conflicts," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 4, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    13. Antonis Adam & Andreas C. Drichoutis & Maria Georgoula & Pantelis Kammas, 2015. "Should I double park or should I go? The effect of political ideology on collective action problems," Working Papers 2015-2, Agricultural University of Athens, Department Of Agricultural Economics.
    14. Libman, Alexander Mikhailovich, 2009. "Эндогенные Границы И Распределение Власти В Федерациях И Международных Сообществах
      [ENDOGENOUS BOUNDARIES AND DISTRIBUTION OF POWER In the Federation]
      ," MPRA Paper 16473, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Francesco Angelini & Guido Candela & Massimiliano Castellani, 2020. "Governance efficiency with and without government," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(1), pages 183-200, January.
    16. Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction
      [Strategie in Turnieren – eine Einführung]
      ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-01, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    17. Lagerlöf, Nils-Petter & Tangerås, Thomas, 2005. "Human Capital, Rent Seeking, and a Transition from Stagnation to Growth," Working Paper Series 656, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    18. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 22, pages 649-709, Elsevier.
    19. Edgardo Barandiarán, 2003. "Protecting Property from Stationary Bandits," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 40(121), pages 626-632.
    20. Johannes Münster, 2007. "Simultaneous inter- and intra-group conflicts," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 32(2), pages 333-352, August.
    21. Münster, Johannes & Staal, Klaas, 2005. "War with Outsiders Makes Peace Inside," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 75, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    22. Leeson, Peter T. & Nowrasteh, Alex, 2011. "Was privateering plunder efficient?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 303-317, August.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government

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