"Domestic Politics and International Conflict"
This paper explores the interactions between domestic politics and international conflict. The analysis shows that electoral uncertainty associated with competition between political parties, each representing a specific group of the electorate, imparts a negative 'bias' on the nation's military spending, given military spending by other nations. In turn, electoral uncertainty lowers other nations' incentive to arm as well. In this context, democratic institutions can be thought of as a possible 'precommitment' mechanism that reduces the severity of conflict between nations and, thereby, increases the amount of resources available globally for consumption. Copyright 1994 by American Economic Association.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1992|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, IRVINECALIFORNIA 91717 U.S.A.|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:calirv:90-92-30. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.