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A Predator-Prey Model of Appropriation, Production, and Exchange

Author

Listed:
  • Charles Anderton

    () (Department of Economics, College of the Holy Cross)

  • Charles Anderton

    () (Department of Economics, Clark University)

  • John Carter

    () (Department of Economics, College of the Holy Cross)

Abstract

Appropriation possibilities significantly alter economic fundamentals in a production and exchange economy. This is the primary lesson of our model, which combines Ricardian trade and the potential for predator/prey behavior. The model shows how conflict can be subdued by mutual gains from trade, but at a resource cost that modifies the exchange itself. On the other hand, it identifies conditions wherein appropriation incentives are so strong that specialized production and trade are precluded altogether. The model also reveals a new way to think about and measure the gains from trade.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles Anderton & Charles Anderton & John Carter, 1996. "A Predator-Prey Model of Appropriation, Production, and Exchange," Working Papers 9602, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hcx:wpaper:9602
    as

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    appropriation; property rights; Predator-Prey game; conflict; exchange;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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