Inside vs Outside Ownership: A Political Theory of the Firm
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- Müller, Holger M. & Wärneryd, Karl, 1999. "Inside vs Outside Ownership - A Political Theory of the Firm," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 99-82, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Müller, Holger M. & Wärneryd, Karl, 1999. "Inside vs. Outside Ownership : A Political Theory of the Firm," Papers 99-82, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
- Karl Warneryd, 2000. "Inside vs. Outside Ownership: A Political Theory of the Firm," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0985, Econometric Society.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Kolesnik, Georgiy, 2010.
"Математическая Модель Экономической Системы С Распределенными Правами Собственности
[A Mathematical Model of the Economic System with Distributed Property Rights]," MPRA Paper 47680, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 25 May 2010.
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[Die Beschränkung des genuinen Homo Economicus: Warum wirtschaftliche Prozesse und Governancestruktur," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2003-03, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
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More about this item
KeywordsOutside ownership; rent-seeking; conflict; property rights; theory of the firm.;
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2000-01-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-CFN-2000-01-24 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-FIN-2000-01-24 (Finance)
- NEP-IND-2000-01-24 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2000-01-24 (Microeconomics)
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