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Distributional conflict in organizations

  • Inderst, Roman
  • Muller, Holger M.
  • Warneryd, Karl

Hierarchy can function as an instrument to channel influence activities or power struggles in organizations. Contrary to what has frequently been argued, we show that multi-divisional organizations may involve lower influence costs than single-tier organizations, even though they offer more scope for organizational conflict and have more executives that can be influenced. These benefits derive from two effects. First, part of the conflict in multi-divisional organizations takes place on the division level, where a small number of agents fight over only a fraction of the overall prize. Second, by grouping agents into common divisions, multi-divisional organizations create free-rider problems in rent seeking. We apply our framework to divestitures and the transition from the U- to the M-form by US corporations in the 1920s.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 51 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Pages: 385-402

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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:51:y:2007:i:2:p:385-402
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer

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