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Caps on Political Lobbying

In: 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2

Author

Listed:
  • Yeon-Koo Che

    (University of Wisconsin
    Yale Law School)

  • Ian L. Gale

    (Georgetown University)

Abstract

The cost of political campaigns in the United States has risen substantially in recent years. For example, real spending on congressional election campaigns doubled between 1976 and 1992 (Steven D. Levitt, 1995). There are many reasons why increased campaign spending might be socially harmful. First, increased spending means increased fund-raising, which may keep politicians from their legislative duties. Second, a lobbyist who makes a large campaign contribution may have undue influence on electoral outcomes, on the shaping of legislation, or on the outcome of regulatory proceedings. That is, the socially preferred candidate or legislation may not prevail. Likewise, a lobbyist involved in a regulatory matter or a competition for a government contract may benefit unduly from a legislater’s investigation. Third, a preception that campagign contributes purches influence may lead to incresed tolerance of corrupted in the private sector

Suggested Citation

  • Yeon-Koo Che & Ian L. Gale, 2008. "Caps on Political Lobbying," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 337-345, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79247-5_19
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_19
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    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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