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On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games

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  • Szidarovszky, Ferenc
  • Okuguchi, Koji

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  • Szidarovszky, Ferenc & Okuguchi, Koji, 1997. "On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 135-140, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:18:y:1997:i:1:p:135-140
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Szidarovszky, F & Yakowitz, S, 1977. "A New Proof of the Existence and Uniqueness of the Cournot Equilibrium," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 18(3), pages 787-789, October.
    2. Perez-Castrillo, J David & Verdier, Thierry, 1992. "A General Analysis of Rent-Seeking Games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 335-350, April.
    3. Okuguchi, Koji, 1993. "Unified approach to Cournot models : Oligopoly, taxation and aggregate provision of a pure public good," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 233-245, May.
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