IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/dyncon/v32y2008i4p1204-1211.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Global stability of unique Nash equilibrium in Cournot oligopoly and rent-seeking game

Author

Listed:
  • Okuguchi, Koji
  • Yamazaki, Takeshi

Abstract

A sufficient condition is derived for the global stability of a unique interior Nash equilibrium in an aggregative game. The condition is applied to investigate the global stability of the Nash-Cournot equilibrium in Cournot oligopoly without product differentiation and that of the Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games.

Suggested Citation

  • Okuguchi, Koji & Yamazaki, Takeshi, 2008. "Global stability of unique Nash equilibrium in Cournot oligopoly and rent-seeking game," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 1204-1211, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:32:y:2008:i:4:p:1204-1211
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-1889(07)00123-6
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. R. D. Theocharis, 1960. "On the Stability of the Cournot Solution on the Oligopoly Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(2), pages 133-134.
    2. Szidarovszky, Ferenc & Okuguchi, Koji, 1997. "On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 135-140, January.
    3. Vives, Xavier, 1990. "Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 305-321.
    4. Perez-Castrillo, J David & Verdier, Thierry, 1992. "A General Analysis of Rent-Seeking Games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 335-350, April.
    5. Amir, Rabah, 1996. "Cournot Oligopoly and the Theory of Supermodular Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 132-148, August.
    6. Furth, Dave, 1986. "Stability and instability in oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 197-228, December.
    7. F. H. Hahn, 1962. "The Stability of the Cournot Oligopoly Solution," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(4), pages 329-331.
    8. Dixit, Avinash K, 1986. "Comparative Statics for Oligopoly," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(1), pages 107-122, February.
    9. al-Nowaihi, A. & Levine, P. L., 1985. "The stability of the cournot oligopoly model: A reassessment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 307-321, August.
    10. Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh, 2000. "Is a Unique Cournot Equilibrium Locally Stable?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 206-218, August.
    11. Okuguchi, Koji, 1993. "Unified approach to Cournot models : Oligopoly, taxation and aggregate provision of a pure public good," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 233-245, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Roy, Sunanda & Sabarwal, Tarun, 2012. "Characterizing stability properties in games with strategic substitutes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 337-353.
    2. Hefti, Andreas, 2016. "On the relationship between uniqueness and stability in sum-aggregative, symmetric and general differentiable games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 83-96.
    3. Andreas M. Hefti, 2013. "Local contraction-stability and uniqueness," ECON - Working Papers 112, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    4. Colombo, Luca & Labrecciosa, Paola, 2013. "On the convergence to the Cournot equilibrium in a productive asset oligopoly," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 441-445.
    5. Koji Okuguchi, 2012. "General Analysis of Cournot Mixed Oligopoly with Partial Privatization," Eurasian Economic Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 2(1), pages 48-62, June.
    6. Karafyllis, Iasson & Jiang, Zhong-Ping & Athanasiou, George, 2010. "Nash Equilibrium and Robust Stability in Dynamic Games: A Small-Gain Perspective," MPRA Paper 26890, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 23 Sep 2010.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:32:y:2008:i:4:p:1204-1211. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jedc .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.