Local contraction-stability and uniqueness
This paper investigates the relationship between uniqueness of Nash equilibria and local stability with respect to the best-response dynamics in the cases of sum-aggregative and symmetric games. If strategies are equilibrium complements, local stability and uniqueness are the same formal properties of the game. With equilibrium substitutes, local stability is stronger than uniqueness. If players adjust sequentially rather than simultaneously, this tends towards making a symmetric equilibria of symmetric games more stable. Finally, the relationship between the stability of the Nash best-response dynamics is compared to the stability of the response-dynamics induced by aggregate-taking behavior.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2013|
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