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On the Release of Players to National Teams

Listed author(s):
  • Oliver Guertler

    ()

    (Department of Economics, University of Cologne)

  • Markus Lang

    ()

    (Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich)

  • Tim Pawlowski

    ()

    (Department of Sport Economics and Sport Management, German Sport University Cologne)

The release of players from a club to the national team often leads to a conflict concerning the duration of the players' stay with the national team. Based on a theoretical bargaining model, we examine whether intervention in this conflict by a governing body is desirable. We show that bargaining between the club and the national team yields a socially inefficient outcome if financial compensation is either prohibited or limited. If, however, the national team is allowed to pay unlimited financial compensation to the club, it is not necessary to intervene in the negotiations because the bargaining outcome will be socially optimal.

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File URL: http://college.holycross.edu/RePEc/spe/GuertlerLangPawlowski_NationalPlayers.pdf
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Paper provided by International Association of Sports Economists & North American Association of Sports Economists in its series Working Papers with number 1124.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2011
Handle: RePEc:spe:wpaper:1124
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.cdes.fr/index.php?id=fr69

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Web page: http://www.byuresearch.org/naasportseconomists/

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