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The Effect of Salary Caps in Professional Team Sports on Social Welfare

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Helmut Dietl

    ()

    (Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich)

  • Markus Lang

    ()

    (Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich)

  • Alexander Rathke

    ()

    (Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich)

Abstract

Increasing financial disparity and spiralling wages in European football have triggered a debate about the introduction of salary caps. This paper provides a theoretical model of a team sports leagues and studies the welfare effect of salary caps. It shows that salary caps will increase competitive balance and decrease overall salary payments within the league. The resulting effect on social welfare is counter-intuitive and depends on the preference of fans for aggregate talent and for competitive balance. A salary cap that binds only for large market clubs will increase social welfare if fans prefer aggregate talent despite the fact that the salary cap will result in lower aggregate talent. If fans prefer competitive balance, on the other hand, any binding salary cap will reduce social welfare.

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File URL: http://repec.business.uzh.ch/RePEc/iso/ISU_WPS/72_ISU_full.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU) in its series Working Papers with number 0072.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2007
Handle: RePEc:iso:wpaper:0072
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Keywords: Salary Caps; Social Welfare; Competitive Balance; Team Sports League;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
  • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
  • L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
  • M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics

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  1. Kesenne, Stefan, 2000. "The Impact of Salary Caps in Professional Team Sports," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 47(4), pages 422-430, September.
  2. Paul D. Staudohar, 2005. "The Hockey Lockout of 2004-05," IASE Conference Papers 0504, International Association of Sports Economists.
  3. Jeffery Borland, 2003. "Demand for Sport," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(4), pages 478-502, Winter.
  4. Rodney Fort & James Quirk, 1995. "Cross-subsidization, Incentives, and Outcomes in Professional Team Sports Leagues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 33(3), pages 1265-1299, September.
  5. Helmut M. Dietl & Markus Lang, 2008. "The Effect Of Gate Revenue Sharing On Social Welfare," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 26(3), pages 448-459, 07.
  6. Marco Runkel, 2006. "Optimal contest design, closeness and the contest success function," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 217-231, October.
  7. Simon Rottenberg, 1956. "The Baseball Players' Labor Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 242-242.
  8. Helmut M. Dietl & Egon Franck & Markus Lang, 2008. "Overinvestment In Team Sports Leagues: A Contest Theory Model," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 55(3), pages 353-368, 07.
  9. Vrooman, John, 2000. "The Economics of American Sports Leagues," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 47(4), pages 364-398, September.
  10. Sonia Falconieri & Frédéric Palomino & József Sákovics, 2004. "Collective Versus Individual Sale of Television Rights in League Sports," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(5), pages 833-862, 09.
  11. Stefan Szymanski, 2003. "The Economic Design of Sporting Contests," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1137-1187, December.
  12. Sloane, Peter J, 1971. "The Economics of Professional Football: The Football Club as a Utility Maximiser," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 18(2), pages 121-146, June.
  13. Whitney, James D, 1993. "Bidding Till Bankrupt: Destructive Competition in Professional Team Sports," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 31(1), pages 100-115, January.
  14. KÉSENNE, Stefan, "undated". "The salary cap proposal of the G-14 in European football," Working Papers 2003018, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
  15. Stefan Kesenne, 2000. "Revenue Sharing and Competitive Balance in Professional Team Sports," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 1(1), pages 56-65, February.
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