Overinvestment in Team Sports Leagues: A Contest Theory Model
This paper applies contest theory to provide an integrated framework of a team sports league and analyses the competitive interaction between clubs. We show that dissipation of the league revenue arises from `overinvestment' in playing talent as a direct consequence of the ruinous competitive interaction between clubs. This overinvestment problem increases if the discriminatory power of the contest function increases, revenue-sharing decreases, and the size of an additional exogenous prize increases. We further show that clubs invest more when they play in an open compared to a closed league. Moreover, the overinvestment problem within open leagues increases with the revenue differential between leagues.
|Date of creation:||2005|
|Date of revision:||2007|
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- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1993.
"The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when R > 2: Mixed Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates,"
10-93-9, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D., 1993. "The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game When R > 2: Mixed Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates," Papers 9368, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D., 1993. "The Solution of the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when R > 2 : Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates," Discussion Paper 1993-68, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1993. "The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when r>2: Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1039, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- Helmut Dietl & Egon Franck & Patrick, 2003. "Überinvestitionsprobleme in einer Sportliga," Working Papers 0020, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
- Roger Noll, 2002. "The Economics of Promotion and Relegation in Sports Leagues: The Cases of English Football," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 3(2), pages 169-203, May.
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