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A Theoretical Analysis of the Influence of Money Injections on Risk Taking in Football Clubs

Author

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  • Egon Franck

    () (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich)

  • Markus Lang

    () (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich)

Abstract

Third party money injections of benefactors (sugar daddies) function as a bailout mechanism for otherwise insolvent football clubs. The successful implementation of the new UEFA "financial fair play" regulations will abrogate this bailout mechanism. We develop a theoretical model of a representative club and a sugar daddy to study the adverse incentive effects produced by the money injections of sugar daddies. We show that the existence of a sugar daddy induces the club to choose a riskier investment strategy and the more the sugar daddy commits to bailout the club, the more the clubs' optimal level of riskiness increases. Moreover, a private sugar daddy bails out the club less often than a public sugar daddy. Our model further shows that a "too-big-to-fail" phenomenon exists because it is optimal to always bailout a club if its market size is sufficiently large. Finally, we derive conditions under which the FFP and the pre-FFP regulations, respectively, are desirable from a welfare perspective.

Suggested Citation

  • Egon Franck & Markus Lang, 2013. "A Theoretical Analysis of the Influence of Money Injections on Risk Taking in Football Clubs," Working Papers 0160, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
  • Handle: RePEc:iso:wpaper:0160
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Markus Lang & Martin Grossmann & Philipp Theiler, 2011. "The Sugar Daddy Game: How Wealthy Investors Change Competition in Professional Team Sports," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 167(4), pages 557-577, December.
    2. Egon Franck, 2010. "Private Firm, Public Corporation or Member’s Association Governance Structures in European Football," International Journal of Sport Finance, Fitness Information Technology, vol. 5(2), pages 108-127, May.
    3. Goodhart, Charles A.E. & Huang, Haizhou, 2005. "The lender of last resort," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 1059-1082, May.
    4. Jean-Charles Rochet & Xavier Vives, 2004. "Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right After All?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(6), pages 1116-1147, December.
    5. Helmut M. Dietl & Markus Lang & Stephan Werner, 2009. "Social Welfare in Sports Leagues with Profit-Maximizing and/or Win-Maximizing Clubs," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 375-396, October.
    6. Martin Grossmann & Helmut Dietl & Markus Lang, 2010. "Revenue Sharing and Competitive Balance in a Dynamic Contest Model," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 36(1), pages 17-36, February.
    7. Helmut M. Dietl & Egon Franck & Markus Lang, 2008. "Overinvestment In Team Sports Leagues: A Contest Theory Model," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 55(3), pages 353-368, July.
    8. Helmut M. Dietl & Egon Franck & Markus Lang & Alexander Rathke, 2012. "Salary Cap Regulation In Professional Team Sports," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(3), pages 307-319, July.
    9. Helmut M. Dietl & Markus Lang & Alexander Rathke, 2011. "The Combined Effect Of Salary Restrictions And Revenue Sharing In Sports Leagues," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 49(2), pages 447-463, April.
    10. Peeters, Thomas, 2012. "Media revenue sharing as a coordination device in sports leagues," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 153-163.
    11. Tim Pawlowski & Christoph Breuer & Arnd Hovemann, 2010. "Top Clubs’ Performance and the Competitive Situation in European Domestic Football Competitions," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 11(2), pages 186-202, April.
    12. Liam J. A. Lenten, 2008. "Unbalanced Schedules And The Estimation Of Competitive Balance In The Scottish Premier League," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 55(4), pages 488-508, September.
    13. Bastien Drut & Gaël Raballand, 2012. "Why does financial regulation matter for European professional football clubs?," Post-Print hal-01410568, HAL.
    14. Stefan Kesenne, 2000. "Revenue Sharing and Competitive Balance in Professional Team Sports," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 1(1), pages 56-65, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marc Rohde & Christoph Breuer, 2016. "Europe’s Elite Football: Financial Growth, Sporting Success, Transfer Investment, and Private Majority Investors," International Journal of Financial Studies, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(2), pages 1-20, June.
    2. Paul Madden, 2014. "Does Break-Even Regulation of Soccer Clubs Make Sense?," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 1405, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    3. Thomas Peeters & Stefan Szymanski, 2014. "Financial fair play in European football," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 29(78), pages 343-390, April.
    4. Budzinski, Oliver, 2017. "Sind Wettbewerbe im Profisport Rattenrennen?," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 104, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    5. PEETERS, Thomas & SZYMANSKI, Stefan, 2012. "Vertical restraints in soccer: Financial fair play and the English Premier League," Working Papers 2012028, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Regulation; sports; UEFA; risk; bailout;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism

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