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A Rationale for the Coexistence of Central and Decentral Marketing in Team Sports

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  • Oliver Gürtler

Abstract

. In some sports leagues, the sports association sells broadcasting rights centrally in order to create competitive balance. In other ones, the market is decentral. As a result, there is competitive imbalance. In this paper, the preferred kind of marketing of sports associations is analysed. Distinctions are made between three cases. In case one, the sports association is only interested in competitive balance. In the second case, it wishes to create a single high‐performing team, and in the third, it maximizes aggregate performance. It is found that, depending on the preferences of the association, both kinds of marketing can be optimal.

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  • Oliver Gürtler, 2007. "A Rationale for the Coexistence of Central and Decentral Marketing in Team Sports," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 8(1), pages 89-106, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:germec:v:8:y:2007:i:1:p:89-106
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0475.2007.00135.x
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics
    • L8 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

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