Who is declared dead lives longer
We consider a contest between a small and a large team. On the one hand, the large team has the advantage of more people exerting effort (quantity effect). On the other hand, the large team suffers from more free riding (free-riding effect). The results show that - depending on the convexity of the cost function - the small team will have a higher probability of winning the contest, if the free-rider effect dominates the quantity effect. Moreover, even if the large team has a higher winning probability, an individual player prefers to belong to the small team.
Volume (Year): 10 (2003)
Issue (Month): 15 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/RAEL20|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEL20|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Huck, Steffen & Konrad, Kai A. & Muller, Wieland, 2001.
"Divisionalization in contests,"
Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 89-93, January.
- Gradstein, Mark & Konrad, Kai A, 1999. "Orchestrating Rent Seeking Contests," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(458), pages 536-45, October.
- Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996.
"Contest Success Functions,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-90, February.
- Nitzan, Shmuel, 1991. "Collective Rent Dissipation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(409), pages 1522-34, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:10:y:2003:i:15:p:995-997. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael McNulty)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.