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Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry

Author

Listed:
  • Jay Pil Choi

    (Department of Economics, Michigan State University)

  • Subhasish M. Chowdhury

    () (School of Economics, University of East Anglia)

  • Jaesoo Kim

    (Department of Economics, IUPUI, Indianapolis)

Abstract

We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group mem- bers in a group conflict, and at the same time engage in contest with fellow group members to appropriate the possible reward. We introduce within group power asymmetry and complementarity in members' efforts and analyze how each group's internal conflict influences its chance of winning in the external conflict. We find that the stronger player's relative contribution to external conflict is higher in a group in which the power distribution is relatively more asymmetric. Furthermore, a more conflictive group may expend more effort in external conflict if the group exhibits enough degrees of complementarity in their group effort. The relative payoff of the stronger player also depends on the degree of complementarity in collective action and it is possible for the weaker player to earn a higher payoff.

Suggested Citation

  • Jay Pil Choi & Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Jaesoo Kim, 2011. "Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 025, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  • Handle: RePEc:uea:aepppr:2011_25
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Dasgupta, Indraneel & Neogi, Ranajoy Guha, 2017. "Between-Group Contests over Group-Specific Public Goods with Within-Group Fragmentation," IZA Discussion Papers 10881, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Contest; Collective decision; Group contest; Asymmetry; Internal conflict;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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