The social cost of contestable benefits
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Saibal KAR & Biswajit MANDAL & Sugata MARJIT & Vivekananda MUKHERJEE, 2020.
"Seeking Rent In The Informal Sector,"
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 91(1), pages 151-164, March.
- Kar, Saibal & Mandal, Biswajit & Marjit, Sugata & Mukherjee, Vivekananda, 2019. "Seeking Rent in the Informal Sector," IZA Discussion Papers 12068, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
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More about this item
Keywords
Rent seeking; contests; political discretion; academic merit; ideology.; Recherche de privilèges; concours; discrétion politique; mérite académique; idéologie.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-HPE-2017-04-30 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
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