Group specific public goods, orchestration of interest groups with free riding
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- Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2003.
"Political culture and monopoly price determination,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 1-19, 08.
- Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2002. "Political Culture and Monopoly Price Determination," CESifo Working Paper Series 646, CESifo Group Munich.
- Riaz, Khalid & Shogren, Jason F. & Johnson, Stanley R., 1995.
"A General Model of Rent Seeking for Public Goods,"
Staff General Research Papers
861, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Katz, Eliakim & Nitzan, Shmuel & Rosenberg, Jacob, 1990. " Rent-Seeking for Pure Public Goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 49-60, April.
- Ellingsen, Tore, 1991.
"Strategic Buyers and the Social Cost of Monopoly,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 648-57, June.
- Gil Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2006. "The Politics of Randomness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 423-433, October.
- Baik, Kyung Hwan, 1993. "Effort levels in contests : The public-good prize case," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 363-367.
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