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Group specific public goods, orchestration of interest groups with free riding

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  • Gil Epstein
  • Yosef Mealem

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Gil Epstein & Yosef Mealem, 2009. "Group specific public goods, orchestration of interest groups with free riding," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(3), pages 357-369, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:139:y:2009:i:3:p:357-369
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9398-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2003. "Political culture and monopoly price determination," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(1), pages 1-19, August.
    2. Kyung Baik, 2008. "Contests with group-specific public-good prizes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(1), pages 103-117, January.
    3. Ellingsen, Tore, 1991. "Strategic Buyers and the Social Cost of Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 648-657, June.
    4. Gil Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2006. "The Politics of Randomness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(2), pages 423-433, October.
    5. Katz, Eliakim & Nitzan, Shmuel & Rosenberg, Jacob, 1990. "Rent-Seeking for Pure Public Goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 49-60, April.
    6. Riaz, Khalid & Shogren, Jason F & Johnson, Stanley R, 1995. "A General Model of Rent Seeking for Public Goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 82(3-4), pages 243-259, March.
    7. Baik, Kyung Hwan, 1993. "Effort levels in contests : The public-good prize case," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 363-367.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Contests; Rent seeking; Public good; Heterogeneity; Free-riding; Orchestration of interest groups; D72; C72; H41;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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