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Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests between Groups

  • Roman Sheremeta


    (Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University)

This experiment investigates contests between groups. Each group has one strong player, with a higher valuation for the prize, and two weak players, with lower valuations. In contests where individual efforts are perfect substitutes, all players expend significantly higher efforts than predicted by theory. In best-shot contests, where group performance depends on the best performer, most of the effort is expended by strong players while weak players free-ride. In weakest-link contests, where group performance depends on the worst performer, there is almost no free-riding and all players expend similar positive efforts conforming to the group Pareto dominant equilibrium.

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Paper provided by Chapman University, Economic Science Institute in its series Working Papers with number 10-25.

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Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:chu:wpaper:10-25
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