Endowment Effects in Contests
We design an experiment to test if the manner in which subjects receive the endowment has any bearing on the amount of overbidding in contests. We find that overbidding is significantly higher when subjects are given a large per-experiment endowment rather than when the endowment is given per-period. Risk-aversion and non-monetary utility of winning play important roles in explaining our findings.
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