Cooperation and Effort in Group Contests
We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good comparing two situations: (i) where all players act independently; and (ii) where the players of each group cooperate. This comparison leads us to the conclusion that it is possible for one group to contribute more (and have a higher expected payoff) in the non-cooperative regime than in the cooperative regime. .
Volume (Year): 32 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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