Everyone Is A Winner: Promoting Cooperation Through Non-Rival Intergroup Competition
In this paper, we study the effectiveness of intergroup competition in promoting cooperative behavior. We focus on intergroup competition that is non-rival in the sense that everyone can be a winner. This type of competition does not give groups an incentive to outcompete others. However, in spite of this fact, we find that intergroup competition produces a universal increase in cooperation. Furthermore, in settings where there are strong incentives to compete, intergroup competition benefits a majority of individuals.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2008|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Øster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark|
Phone: (+45) 35 32 30 10
Fax: +45 35 32 30 00
Web page: http://www.econ.ku.dk
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, January.
- Ernst Fehr & Michael Naef & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2006.
"Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments: Comment,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1912-1917, December.
- Fehr, Ernst & Naef, Michael & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2006. "Inequality aversion, efficiency, and maximin preferences in simple distribution experiments: Comment," Munich Reprints in Economics 20639, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Riechmann, Thomas & Weimann, Joachim, 2008.
"Competition as a coordination device: Experimental evidence from a minimum effort coordination game,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 437-454, June.
- Thomas Riechmann & Joachim Weimann, 2004. "Competition as a Coordination Device. Experimental Evidence from a Minimum Effort Coordination Game," Game Theory and Information 0405011, EconWPA.
- M. Vittoria Levati & Matthias Sutter & Eline van der Heijden, 2007. "Leading by Example in a Public Goods Experiment with Heterogeneity and Incomplete Information," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 51(5), pages 793-818, October.
- M. Vittoria Levati & Matthias Sutter & Eline van der Heijden, 2005. "Leading by example in a public goods experiment with heterogeneity and incomplete information," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-17, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- van Dijk, Frans & Sonnemans, Joep & van Winden, Frans, 2001. "Incentive systems in a real effort experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 187-214, February.
- Frans van Dijk & Joep Sonnemans & Frans van Winden, 1998. "Incentive Systems in a Real Effort Experiment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 98-023/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Frans van Dijk & Joep Sonnemans & Frans van Winden, 2000. "Incentive Systems in a Real Effort Experiment," CESifo Working Paper Series 272, CESifo Group Munich.
- Sausgruber, Rupert & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2007. "Pure redistribution and the provision of public goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 95(3), pages 334-338, June.
- Rupert Sausgruber & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2006. "Pure Redistribution and the Provision of Public Goods," Discussion Papers 06-24, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 6-38, July.
- McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1994. "Quantal Response Equilibria For Normal Form Games," Working Papers 883, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- R. McKelvey & T. Palfrey, 2010. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 510, David K. Levine.
- Dirk Engelmann & Martin Strobel, 2006. "Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1918-1923, December.
- Isaac, R Mark & Walker, James M, 1988. "Communication and Free-Riding Behavior: The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 26(4), pages 585-608, October.
- Nalbantian, Haig R & Schotter, Andrew, 1997. "Productivity under Group Incentives: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 314-341, June.
- Nalbantian, Haig & Schotter, Andrew, 1994. "Productivity Under Group Incentives: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 94-04, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Ledyard, John O., "undated". "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research," Working Papers 861, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- John O. Ledyard, 1994. "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research," Public Economics 9405003, EconWPA, revised 22 May 1994.
- J. Ledyard, 1997. "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research," Levine's Working Paper Archive 509, David K. Levine.
- Knoeber, Charles R & Thurman, Walter N, 1994. "Testing the Theory of Tournaments: An Empirical Analysis of Broiler Production," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(2), pages 155-179, April.
- Josef Falkinger, 2000. "A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 247-264, March.
- Josef Falkinger & Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, "undated". "A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods - Experimental Evidence," IEW - Working Papers 003, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
- Bornstein, Gary & Gneezy, Uri & Nagel, Rosmarie, 2002. "The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: an experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-25, October.
- Gary Bornstein & Uri Gneezy & Rosemarie Nagel, 1999. "The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study," Economics Working Papers 393, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Ernst Fehr & Bettina Rockenbach, 2003. "Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism," Microeconomics 0305007, EconWPA.
- R. Isaac & James Walker & Susan Thomas, 1984. "Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 113-149, January.
- Tan, Jonathan H.W. & Bolle, Friedel, 2007. "Team competition and the public goods game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 133-139, July.
- Marwell, Gerald & Ames, Ruth E., 1981. "Economists free ride, does anyone else? : Experiments on the provision of public goods, IV," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 295-310, June.
- Frey, Bruno S & Jegen, Reto, 2001. " Motivation Crowding Theory," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(5), pages 589-611, December.
- Anderson, Simon P. & Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A., 1998. "A theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 297-323, November.
- Gary Bornstein, 2002. "Intergroup conflict: Individual, group and collective interests," Discussion Paper Series dp297, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)