Intergroup conflict: Individual, group and collective interests
Intergroup conflicts generally involve conflicts of interests within the competing groups as well. This paper outlines a taxonomy of games, called team games, which incorporate the intragroup and intergroup levels of conflict. Its aims are to provide a coherent framework for analyzing the prototypical problems of cooperation and competition that arise within and between groups, and to review an extensive research program which has utilized this framework to study individual and group behavior in the laboratory. Depending on the game's payoff structure, contradictions or conflicts were created between the rational choices at the individual, group, and collective levels -- a generalization of the contradiction between individual and collective rationality occurring in the traditional mixed-motive games. These contradictions were studied so as to identify the theoretical and behavioral conditions that determine which level of rationality prevails.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2002|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Personality and Social Psychology Review, 2003, vol. 7, pp. 129-145.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Feldman Building - Givat Ram - 91904 Jerusalem|
Web page: http://www.ratio.huji.ac.il/
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gary Bornstein & Uri Gneezy & Rosemarie Nagel, 1999.
"The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study,"
Economics Working Papers
393, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Bornstein, Gary & Gneezy, Uri & Nagel, Rosmarie, 2002. "The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: an experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-25, October.
- Bornstein, Gary & Winter, Eyal & Goren, Harel, 1996. "Experimental study of repeated team-games," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 629-639, December.
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