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Individual and group behaviours in the traveller’s dilemma: an experimental study

  • Morone, Andrea
  • Morone, Piergiuseppe

This paper provides an experimental test of the traveller’s dilemma using individual and group data. Our investigation aims to address three fundamental research questions, which can be summarised as follows: (i) claims are affected by the size of the penalty/reward; (ii) individual decisions differ significantly from group decisions; (iii) individual claims are affected by the induction of a focal point a là Schelling. Experimental findings reported in this paper provide answers to each of these questions showing that: (i) although the size of the penalty/reward did not affect subject choices in the first-period, it played a key role in determining subjects’ behaviour in the repeated game; (ii) overall, groups behave more rationally, in the sense that they were always closer to the Nash equilibrium; (iii) the reference point did not encourage coordination around the Pareto optimal choice.

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File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38199/1/MPRA_paper_38199.pdf
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 38199.

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Date of creation: 2012
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:38199
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  1. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
  2. Kocher, Martin & Matthias Sutter, 2003. "Individual versus group behavior and the role of the decision making procedure in gift-exchange experiments," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 125, Royal Economic Society.
  3. James C. Cox & Stephen C. Hayne, . "Barking Up the Right Tree: Are Small Groups Rational Agents?," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2006-02, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
  4. Gary Bornstein & Tamar Kugler & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2002. "Individual and Group Decisions in the Centipede Game: Are Groups More “Rational” Players?," Discussion Paper Series dp298, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  5. Ian Bateman & Alistair Munro, 2005. "An Experiment on Risky Choice Amongst Households," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(502), pages C176-C189, 03.
  6. James Andreoni & Ragan Petrie, 2005. "Beauty, Gender and Stereotypes: Evidence from Laboratory Experiments," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2006-22, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
  7. Morone, Andrea & Morone, Piergiuseppe, 2012. "Are small groups expected utility?," MPRA Paper 38198, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Brañas-Garza, Pablo & Espinosa, María Paz & Rey-Biel, Pedro, 2011. "Travelers' types," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(1-2), pages 25-36, April.
    • Espinosa Alejos, María Paz & Brañas Garza, Pablo & Rey Biel, Pedro, 2010. "Travellers' Types," DFAEII Working Papers 2010-03, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
    • Pablo Brañas-Garza & Maréa Paz Espinosa & Pedro Rey-Biel, 2008. "Travelers' Types," Working Papers 407, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  9. Kaushik Basuy & Leonardo Becchetti & Luca Stanca, 2008. "Experiments with the Traveler's Dilemma: Welfare, Strategic Choice and Implicit Collusion," Working Papers 147, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2008.
  10. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00118973 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Andrea Morone & Piergiuseppe Morone, 2007. "Guessing Games and People Behaviours: What Can we Learn?," series 0015, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Metodi Matematici - Università di Bari, revised Feb 2007.
  12. Matthias Sutter, 2004. "Are four heads better than two? An experimental beauty-contest game with teams of different size," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2004-15, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  13. Gary Bornstein & Ilan Yaniv, 1998. "Individual and Group Behavior in the Ultimatum Game: Are Groups More “Rational†Players?," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 101-108, June.
  14. David Masclet & Youenn Loheac & Laurent Denant-Boèmont & Nathalie Colombier, 2006. "Group and individual risk preferences : a lottery-choice experiment," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00118973, HAL.
  15. Andrea Morone & Piergiuseppe Morone, 2010. "Boundary and interior equilibria: what drives convergence in a ‘beauty contest'?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(3), pages 2097-2106.
  16. Ronald Bosman & Frans van Winden, 2002. "Emotional Hazard in a Power-to-take Experiment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(476), pages 147-169, January.
  17. Masclet, David & Colombier, Nathalie & Denant-Boemont, Laurent & Lohéac, Youenn, 2009. "Group and individual risk preferences: A lottery-choice experiment with self-employed and salaried workers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 470-484, June.
  18. Ignacio Palacios-Huerta & Oscar Volij, 2009. "Field Centipedes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1619-35, September.
  19. Susana Cabrera & C. Capra & Rosario Gómez, 2007. "Behavior in one-shot traveler’s dilemma games: model and experiments with advice," Spanish Economic Review, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 129-152, June.
  20. Cason, Timothy N & Mui, Vai-Lam, 1997. "A Laboratory Study of Group Polarisation in the Team Dictator Game," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(444), pages 1465-83, September.
  21. C. Monica Capra, 1999. "Anomalous Behavior in a Traveler's Dilemma?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 678-690, June.
  22. Tilman Becker & Michael Carter & Jörg Naeve, 2005. "Experts Playing the Traveler's Dilemma," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 252/2005, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany.
  23. Sujoy Chakravarty & Emmanuel Dechenaux & Jaideep Roy, 2010. "Ill-Defined versus Precise Pre-Play Communication in the Traveler’s Dilemma," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 351-368, October.
  24. Robert S. Shupp & Arlington Williams, 2003. "Risk Preference Differentials of Small Groups and Individuals," Working Papers 200301, Ball State University, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2006.
  25. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1981. "Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 92-100, August.
  26. Song, Fei, 2009. "Intergroup trust and reciprocity in strategic interactions: Effects of group decision-making mechanisms," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 164-173, January.
  27. Andrea Morone & Serena Sandri & Tobias Uske, 2007. "On the absorbability of the Guessing Game Theory. A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis," series 0017, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Metodi Matematici - Università di Bari, revised Apr 2007.
  28. Bone, John & Hey, John & Suckling, John, 1999. "Are Groups More (or Less) Consistent Than Individuals?," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 63-81, April.
  29. Nagel, Rosemarie, 1995. "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1313-26, December.
  30. David J. Cooper & John H. Kagel, 2005. "Are Two Heads Better Than One? Team versus Individual Play in Signaling Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 477-509, June.
  31. Bone, John, 1998. "Risk-sharing CARA individuals are collectively EU," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 311-317, March.
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