Ill-Defined versus Precise Pre-Play Communication in the Traveler’s Dilemma
This article reports results from an experiment comparing the effects of vague versus precise pre-play communication in a highly competitive two-player game with conflicting interests. In the classic Traveler’s Dilemma, non-binding precise messages about intent of play are pure cheap talk. We conjecture that a form of imprecise pre-play communication whereby subjects can submit ill-defined messages may help foster cooperation because of their vagueness. Comparing behavior both across modes of communication and to a baseline case without communication, we find that cooperation is highest when players can communicate using precise numerical messages. When communication with ill-defined messages is allowed, then conditional on receiving a message, subjects act more cooperatively than when no message is received. However, overall, the ability to exchange ill-defined messages does not substantially improve cooperation.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 77 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.southerneconomic.org/|
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sej:ancoec:v:77:2:y:2010:p:351-368. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Laura Razzolini)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.