A Laboratory Study of Group Polarisation in the Team Dictator Game
This paper introduces the team dictator game to study whether social dynamics within a group can cause groups' decisions to differ systematically from individuals' decisions. In the individual dictator game, a subject dictates the allocation of y dollars; in the team dictator game, a team of two subjects dictates the allocation of 2y dollars. The authors derive and test competing predictions for the two dominant psychological theories of group polarization in this context. The data indicate that team choices tend to be dominated by the more other-regarding member. This result is more consistent with social comparison theory than persuasive argument theory. Copyright 1997 by Royal Economic Society.
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Volume (Year): 107 (1997)
Issue (Month): 444 (September)
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