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Travelers' types

  • Brañas-Garza, Pablo
  • Espinosa, María Paz
  • Rey-Biel, Pedro

This paper uses subjects' diverse self-reported justifications to explain discrepancies between observed heterogeneous behavior and the unique equilibrium prediction in a one-shot traveler's dilemma experiment. Principal components analysis suggests that iterative reasoning, aspiration levels, competitive behavior, attitudes towards risk and penalties and focal points may be behind different choices. Such reasons are coherent with same subjects' behavior in other tests and experiments in which these particular issues are prominent, and thus, we identify "types" of subjects. Overall, we conclude that subjects' self-justifications in complex strategic situations contain informational value which may be used to predict behavior in other situations of economic importance.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 78 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (April)
Pages: 25-36

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:78:y:2011:i:1-2:p:25-36
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  1. Apesteguia, Jose & Huck, Steffen & Oechssler, Jorg, 2007. "Imitation--theory and experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 217-235, September.
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  11. Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Georg Weizs�cker, 2008. "Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal-Form Games," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(3), pages 729-762.
  12. Leonardo Becchetti & Giacomo Degli Antoni & Marco Faillo, 2009. "Shedding Light into Preference Heterogeneity: Why Players of Traveller’s Dilemma Depart from Individual Rationality?," Econometica Working Papers wp09, Econometica.
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