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Experiments with the Traveler's Dilemma: Welfare, Strategic Choice and Implicit Collusion

Author

Listed:
  • Basu, Kaushik

    (Cornell University)

  • Becchetti, Leonardo

    (University of Rome-Tor Vergata)

  • Stanca, Luca

    (University of Milan Bicocca)

Abstract

This paper investigates behavior in the Traveler's Dilemma game and isolates deviations from textbook predictions caused by differences in welfare perceptions and strategic miscalculations. It presents the results of an experimental analysis based on a 2x2 design where the own and the other subject's bonus-penalty parameters are changed independently. We find that the change in own bonus-penalty alone entirely explains the effect on claims of a simultaneous change in one's own and the other's bonus-penalty. An increase in the other subject's bonus-penalty has a significant negative effect on claims when the own bonus-penalty is low, whereas it does not have a significant effect when the own bonus-penalty is high. We also find that expected claims are inconsistent with actual claims in the asymmetric treatments. Focusing on reported strategies, we document substantial heterogeneity and show that changes in choices across treatments are largely explained by risk aversion.

Suggested Citation

  • Basu, Kaushik & Becchetti, Leonardo & Stanca, Luca, 2008. "Experiments with the Traveler's Dilemma: Welfare, Strategic Choice and Implicit Collusion," Working Papers 08-07, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecl:corcae:08-07
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    File URL: https://cae.economics.cornell.edu/08-07.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Baader, Malte & Vostroknutov, Alexander, 2017. "Interaction of reasoning ability and distributional preferences in a social dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 79-91.
    2. Valerio Capraro, 2013. "A Model of Human Cooperation in Social Dilemmas," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(8), pages 1-6, August.
    3. Kaushik Basu & Leonardo Becchetti & Luca Stanca, 2011. "Experiments with the Traveler’s Dilemma: welfare, strategic choice and implicit collusion," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(4), pages 575-595, October.
    4. Gisèle Umbhauer, 2019. "Traveler’s dilemma : how the value of the luggage influences behavior," Working Papers of BETA 2019-13, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    5. Mathieu Lefebvre & Gisèle Umbhauer, 2024. "Traveler’s Dilemma: How the Value of the Luggage Influences Behavior [Dilemme du voyageur : impact comportemental de la valeur du bagage égaré]," Post-Print hal-05127074, HAL.
    6. Stefanos Leonardos & Costis Melolidakis, 2018. "On the Commitment Value and Commitment Optimal Strategies in Bimatrix Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 20(03), pages 1-28, September.
    7. Rodrigo Moro & Esteban Freidin & Fernando Tohmé & Marcelo Auday, 2011. "La teoría de juegos conductual, el dilema del viajero alternativo y la maximización de pagos," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 38(2 Year 20), pages 457-473, December.
    8. Andrea Morone & Piergiuseppe Morone, 2016. "The Focal Point In The Traveller'S Dilemma: An Experimental Study," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(S1), pages 123-132, December.
    9. Rodrigo Moro & Esteban Freidin & Fernando Tohm�, 2015. "Social preferences are not enough: Accounting for anomalous behavior in a complex mixed-motive game," Revista Cuadernos de Economia, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, FCE, CID.
    10. Morone, A. & Morone, P. & Germani, A.R., 2014. "Individual and group behaviour in the traveler's dilemma: An experimental study," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 1-7.
    11. Bernabe, Angelique & Hossain, Tanjim & Yu, Haomiao, 2021. "Truth, Honesty, and Strategic Interactions," MPRA Paper 109968, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

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