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Inspired and inspiring: Hervé Moulin and the discovery of the beauty contest game

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Abstract

We draw an unusually detailed picture of a discovery, the beauty contest game – with Hervé Moulin as the center of the initial inspiration. Since its inception, the beauty contest game and the descriptive level k model has widely contributed to the growth of experimental and behavioral economics and expanded also to other areas within and outside of economics. We illustrate, in particular, the recent interaction between macroeconomic theorists and experimenters, who independently had worked on the puzzles and consequences due to beauty contest features. Furthermore, we introduce a new variety of the two-person beauty contest game with two different payoff structures that leads to different game-theoretic properties unperceived by naïve subjects and game theory experts alike.

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  • Rosemarie Nagel & Christoph Bühren & Björn Frank, 2016. "Inspired and inspiring: Hervé Moulin and the discovery of the beauty contest game," Economics Working Papers 1539, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Nov 2016.
  • Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:1539
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    1. Nagel, Rosemarie & Bühren, Christoph & Frank, Björn, 2017. "Inspired and inspiring: Hervé Moulin and the discovery of the beauty contest game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 191-207.
    2. Amir, Rabah & Evstigneev, Igor V., 2018. "A new look at the classical Bertrand duopoly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 99-103.
    3. Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Koriyama, Yukio & Sutan, Angela & Willinger, Marc, 2019. "The strategic environment effect in beauty contest games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 587-610.
    4. Francisca Jiménez-Jiménez & Javier Rodero Cosano, 2021. "Experimental cheap talk games: strategic complementarity and coordination," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 91(2), pages 235-263, September.
    5. Seth Frey & Robert L. Goldstone, 2018. "Cognitive mechanisms for human flocking dynamics," Journal of Computational Social Science, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 349-375, September.
    6. Ciril Bosch-Rosa & Thomas Meissner, 2020. "The one player guessing game: a diagnosis on the relationship between equilibrium play, beliefs, and best responses," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(4), pages 1129-1147, December.
    7. Akin, Zafer, 2020. "Asymmetric Guessing Games," MPRA Paper 103871, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Ravi Kashyap, 2019. "Concepts, Components and Collections of Trading Strategies and Market Color," Papers 1910.02144, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2020.

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    Keywords

    Keynes; Beauty Contest Games; History; Level k; Micro-; Macro-; Neuro-Economic Experiments.;
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    JEL classification:

    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
    • D87 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Neuroeconomics
    • E12 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Keynes; Keynesian; Post-Keynesian; Modern Monetary Theory
    • N1 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations
    • N80 - Economic History - - Micro-Business History - - - General, International, or Comparative

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