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Experimental Results on Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information

Listed author(s):
  • Mitzkewitz, Michael
  • Nagel, Rosemarie

This paper is about experiments on two versions of ultimatum games with incomplete information, called the offer game and the demand game. We apply the strategy method, that is, each subject had to design a complete strategy in advance instead of reacting spontaneously to a situation which occurs in the game. Game theory predicts very similar outcomes for the offer and the demand games. Our experiments, however, show significant differences in behavior between both games. Using the strategy method allows us to explore the motivations leading to those differences. Since each subject played the same version of the game eight rounds against changing anonymous opponents we can also study subjects' learning behavior. We propose a theory of boundedly rational behavior, called the "anticipation philosophy," which is well supported by the experimental data.

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Article provided by Springer & Game Theory Society in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 22 (1993)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 171-198

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:22:y:1993:i:2:p:171-98
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