Who thinks about the competition? Managerial ability and strategic entry in US local telephone markets
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- Avi Goldfarb & Mo Xiao, 2011. "Who Thinks about the Competition? Managerial Ability and Strategic Entry in US Local Telephone Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pages 3130-3161, December.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
entry games; behavioral industrial organization; cognitive hierarchy; CLECs; local telephone competition;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
- L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2008-10-21 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2008-10-21 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2008-10-21 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2008-10-21 (Microeconomics)
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