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Out of your mind: Eliciting individual reasoning in one shot games

  • Burchardi, Konrad B.
  • Penczynski, Stefan P.
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    We experimentally investigate the fundamental element of the level-k model of reasoning, the level-0 actions and beliefs. We use data from a novel experimental design that allows us to obtain incentivised written accounts of individuals' reasoning. In particular, these accounts allow to infer level-0 beliefs. Level-0 beliefs are not significantly different from 50, and almost 60% of higher level players start their reasoning from a level-0 belief of exactly 50. We also estimate that around one third of the participants play non-strategically. The non-strategic level-0 actions are not uniformly distributed.

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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825613001711
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

    Volume (Year): 84 (2014)
    Issue (Month): C ()
    Pages: 39-57

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:84:y:2014:i:c:p:39-57
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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