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Three Very Simple Games and What It Takes to Solve Them

Author

Listed:
  • Ondrej Rydval

    (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany, and CERGE-EI)

  • Andreas Ortmann

    (CERGE-EI, Charles University Prague and Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic)

  • Michal Ostatnicky

    (CERGE-EI, Charles University Prague and Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic)

Abstract

We study the nature of dominance violations in three minimalist dominance-solvable guessing games, featuring two or three players choosing among two or three strategies. We examine how subjects' reported reasoning translates into their choices and beliefs about others' choices, and how reasoning and choices relate to their measured cognitive and personality characteristics. Only about a third of our subjects reason in accord with dominance; they always make dominant choices and almost always expect others to do so. By contrast, around 60% of subjects describe reasoning processes inconsistent with dominance, yet a quarter of them actually make dominant choices and a fifth of them expect others to do so. Dominance violations seem to arise mainly due to subjects misrepresenting the strategic nature of the guessing games. Reasoning errors are more likely for subjects with lower ability to maintain and allocate attention, as measured by working memory, and for subjects with weaker intrinsic motivation and premeditation attitudes.

Suggested Citation

  • Ondrej Rydval & Andreas Ortmann & Michal Ostatnicky, 2007. "Three Very Simple Games and What It Takes to Solve Them," Jena Economics Research Papers 2007-092, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  • Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2007-092
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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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