IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/lam/wpaper/03-16.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The strategic environment effect in beauty contest games

Author

Listed:
  • Nobuyuki Hanaki
  • Angela Sutan
  • Marc Willnger

Abstract

Recent experimental studies have shown that observed outcomes deviate signiffcantly more from the Nash equilibrium when actions are strategic complements than when they are strategic substitutes. This "strategic environment effect" offers promising insights into the aggregate consequences of interactions among heterogeneous boundedly rational agents, but its macroeconomic implications have been questioned because the underlying experiments involve a small number of agents. We studied beauty contest games with a unique interior Nash equilibrium to determine the critical group size for triggering the strategic environment effect. We show theoretically that the effect operates for interactions among three or more agents. Our experimental results partially support this theory, showing a statistically significant strategic environment effect for groups offive or more agents. Our findings establish that experiments involving a small number of interacting agents can provide major insights into macro phenomena and bolster previous work done on such issues as price dynamics.

Suggested Citation

  • Nobuyuki Hanaki & Angela Sutan & Marc Willnger, 2016. "The strategic environment effect in beauty contest games," Working Papers 03-16, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier.
  • Handle: RePEc:lam:wpaper:03-16
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.lameta.univ-montp1.fr/Documents/DR2016-03.pdf
    File Function: Revised version, 2016
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Haltiwanger, John & Waldman, Michael, 1985. "Rational Expectations and the Limits of Rationality: An Analysis of Heterogeneity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 326-340, June.
    2. Sonnemans, Joep & Tuinstra, Jan, 2010. "Positive expectations feedback experiments and number guessing games as models of financial markets," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 964-984, December.
    3. Jan Potters & Sigrid Suetens, 2009. "Cooperation in Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(3), pages 1125-1147.
    4. Spiegler, Ran, 2014. "Bounded Rationality and Industrial Organization," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199334261.
    5. Nagel, Rosemarie & Bühren, Christoph & Frank, Björn, 2017. "Inspired and inspiring: Hervé Moulin and the discovery of the beauty contest game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 191-207.
    6. Antoni Bosch-Domènech & José G. Montalvo & Rosemarie Nagel & Albert Satorra, 2002. "One, Two, (Three), Infinity, ...: Newspaper and Lab Beauty-Contest Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1687-1701, December.
    7. George A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen, 1985. "A Near-Rational Model of the Business Cycle, with Wage and Price Inertia," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(Supplemen), pages 823-838.
    8. Huck, Steffen & Normann, Hans-Theo & Oechssler, Jorg, 2004. "Two are few and four are many: number effects in experimental oligopolies," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 435-446, April.
    9. Sutan, Angela & Willinger, Marc, 2009. "Guessing with negative feedback: An experiment," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 1123-1133, May.
    10. Vincent P. Crawford & Miguel A. Costa-Gomes, 2006. "Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1737-1768, December.
    11. Dhananjay K. Gode & Shyam Sunder, 1997. "What Makes Markets Allocationally Efficient?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(2), pages 603-630.
    12. Rogers, Brian W. & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Camerer, Colin F., 2009. "Heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1440-1467, July.
    13. Guth, Werner & Kocher, Martin & Sutter, Matthias, 2002. "Experimental 'beauty contests' with homogeneous and heterogeneous players and with interior and boundary equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 219-228, January.
    14. Bao, Te & Hommes, Cars & Sonnemans, Joep & Tuinstra, Jan, 2012. "Individual expectations, limited rationality and aggregate outcomes," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 1101-1120.
    15. McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 6-38, July.
    16. Ernst Fehr & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2005. "Individual Irrationality and Aggregate Outcomes," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(4), pages 43-66, Fall.
    17. Ernst Fehr & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2008. "Limited Rationality and Strategic Interaction: The Impact of the Strategic Environment on Nominal Inertia," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(2), pages 353-394, March.
    18. Haltiwanger, John & Waldman, Michael, 1991. "Responders versus Non-responders: A New Perspective on Heterogeneity," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(408), pages 1085-1102, September.
    19. De Long, J Bradford & Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers & Robert J. Waldmann, 1990. "Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(4), pages 703-738, August.
    20. Russell, Thomas & Thaler, Richard, 1985. "The Relevance of Quasi Rationality in Competitive Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1071-1082, December.
    21. Friedman, Daniel & Huck, Steffen & Oprea, Ryan & Weidenholzer, Simon, 2015. "From imitation to collusion: Long-run learning in a low-information environment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 185-205.
    22. Antoni Bosch-Domènech & José Montalvo & Rosemarie Nagel & Albert Satorra, 2010. "A finite mixture analysis of beauty-contest data using generalized beta distributions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 13(4), pages 461-475, December.
    23. John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1989. "Limited Rationality and Strategic Complements: The Implications for Macroeconomics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(3), pages 463-483.
    24. Jacob K. Goeree & Philippos Louis & Jingjing Zhang, 2018. "Noisy Introspection in the 11–20 Game," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(611), pages 1509-1530, June.
    25. Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A., 2004. "A model of noisy introspection," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 365-382, February.
    26. Ho, Teck-Hua & Camerer, Colin & Weigelt, Keith, 1998. "Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental "p-Beauty Contests."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 947-969, September.
    27. William A. Brock & Cars H. Hommes, 1997. "A Rational Route to Randomness," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1059-1096, September.
    28. Shleifer, Andrei, 2000. "Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198292272.
    29. Cars Hommes & Joep Sonnemans & Jan Tuinstra & Henk van de Velden, 2005. "Coordination of Expectations in Asset Pricing Experiments," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 18(3), pages 955-980.
    30. Ayala Arad & Ariel Rubinstein, 2012. "The 11-20 Money Request Game: A Level-k Reasoning Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(7), pages 3561-3573, December.
    31. Nagel, Rosemarie, 1995. "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1313-1326, December.
    32. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 2001. "Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1402-1422, December.
    33. Stahl, Dale II & Wilson, Paul W., 1994. "Experimental evidence on players' models of other players," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 309-327, December.
    34. Heemeijer, Peter & Hommes, Cars & Sonnemans, Joep & Tuinstra, Jan, 2009. "Price stability and volatility in markets with positive and negative expectations feedback: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 1052-1072, May.
    35. William A. Brock & Cars H. Hommes, 2001. "A Rational Route to Randomness," Chapters, in: W. D. Dechert (ed.), Growth Theory, Nonlinear Dynamics and Economic Modelling, chapter 16, pages 402-438, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    36. Breitmoser, Yves, 2012. "Strategic reasoning in p-beauty contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 555-569.
    37. Gode, Dhananjay K & Sunder, Shyam, 1993. "Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero-Intelligence Traders: Market as a Partial Substitute for Individual Rationality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(1), pages 119-137, February.
    38. John Conlisk, 1996. "Why Bounded Rationality?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(2), pages 669-700, June.
    39. Akerlof, George A & Yellen, Janet L, 1985. "Can Small Deviations from Rationality Make Significant Differences to Economic Equilibria?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 708-720, September.
    40. Grosskopf, Brit & Nagel, Rosemarie, 2008. "The two-person beauty contest," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 93-99, January.
    41. Colin F. Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho & Juin-Kuan Chong, 2004. "A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 119(3), pages 861-898.
    42. Eileen Chou & Margaret McConnell & Rosemarie Nagel & Charles Plott, 2009. "The control of game form recognition in experiments: understanding dominant strategy failures in a simple two person “guessing” game," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 12(2), pages 159-179, June.
    43. Johannes Kaiser, 2007. "An exact and a Monte Carlo proposal to the Fisher–Pitman permutation tests for paired replicates and for independent samples," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, vol. 7(3), pages 402-412, September.
    44. John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth, 2016. "Macroeconomics: A Survey of Laboratory Research," Introductory Chapters, in: The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Volume 2, Princeton University Press.
    45. Peng Fei & Philippe Wanner & Stephane Cotter, 1997. "Approche dynamique de la différence d'espérance de vie entre hommes et femmes en Suisse, entre 1910/11 et 1988/93. Une application des méthodes de décomposition de POLLARD et D'ARRIAGA," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 133(IV), pages 741-754, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Trabelsi, Emna & Hichri, Walid, 2021. "Central Bank Transparency with (semi-)public Information: Laboratory Experiments," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    2. Bao, Te & Hommes, Cars & Pei, Jiaoying, 2021. "Expectation formation in finance and macroeconomics: A review of new experimental evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(C).
    3. Bulutay, Muhammed & Cornand, Camille & Zylbersztejn, Adam, 2022. "Learning to deal with repeated shocks under strategic complementarity: An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 200(C), pages 1318-1343.
    4. Michaël Assous & Muriel Dal Pont Legrand & Harald Hagemann, 2016. "Business cycles and growth," Chapters, in: Gilbert Faccarello & Heinz D. Kurz (ed.), Handbook on the History of Economic Analysis Volume III, chapter 4, pages 27-39, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Cars Hommes & Anita Kopányi-Peuker & Joep Sonnemans, 2021. "Bubbles, crashes and information contagion in large-group asset market experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(2), pages 414-433, June.
    6. Nagel, Rosemarie & Bühren, Christoph & Frank, Björn, 2017. "Inspired and inspiring: Hervé Moulin and the discovery of the beauty contest game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 191-207.
    7. Nobuyuki Hanaki, 2020. "Cognitive ability and observed behavior in laboratory experiments: implications for macroeconomic theory," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(3), pages 355-378, July.
    8. Boun My, Kene & Cornand, Camille & Dos Santos Ferreira, Rodolphe, 2021. "Public information and the concern for coordination," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    9. Liu, Tianwei, 2016. "Heterogeneity in Guessing Games: An Experiment," MPRA Paper 75001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Yukio Koriyama & Ali Ihsan Ozkes, 2017. "Condorcet Jury Theorem and Cognitive Hierarchies: Theory and Experiments," Working Papers halshs-01485748, HAL.
    11. Henning Hermes & Daniel Schunk, 2022. "If you could read my mind–an experimental beauty-contest game with children," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(1), pages 229-253, February.
    12. Zafer Akin, 2023. "Asymmetric guessing games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 94(4), pages 637-676, May.
    13. Weber, Matthias, 2022. "From Individual Human Decisions to Economic and Financial Policies," SocArXiv 5ju7z, Center for Open Science.
    14. Cooper, Kristen B. & Schneider, Henry S. & Waldman, Michael, 2017. "Limited rationality and the strategic environment: Further theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 188-208.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Nagel, Rosemarie & Bühren, Christoph & Frank, Björn, 2017. "Inspired and inspiring: Hervé Moulin and the discovery of the beauty contest game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 191-207.
    2. Nobuyuki Hanaki, 2020. "Cognitive ability and observed behavior in laboratory experiments: implications for macroeconomic theory," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(3), pages 355-378, July.
    3. Cooper, Kristen B. & Schneider, Henry S. & Waldman, Michael, 2017. "Limited rationality and the strategic environment: Further theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 188-208.
    4. Bulutay, Muhammed & Cornand, Camille & Zylbersztejn, Adam, 2022. "Learning to deal with repeated shocks under strategic complementarity: An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 200(C), pages 1318-1343.
    5. Cooper, Kristen & Schneider, Henry & Waldman, Michael, 2021. "Limited rationality and the strategic environment: Further evidence from a pricing game," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    6. Mauersberger, Felix & Nagel, Rosemarie & Bühren, Christoph, 2020. "Bounded rationality in Keynesian beauty contests: A lesson for central bankers?," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 14, pages 1-38.
    7. Choo, Lawrence C.Y & Kaplan, Todd R., 2014. "Explaining Behavior in the "11-20" Game," MPRA Paper 52808, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Sonnemans, Joep & Tuinstra, Jan, 2010. "Positive expectations feedback experiments and number guessing games as models of financial markets," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 964-984, December.
    9. Tiziana Assenza & Te Bao & Cars Hommes & Domenico Massaro, 2014. "Experiments on Expectations in Macroeconomics and Finance," Research in Experimental Economics, in: Experiments in Macroeconomics, volume 17, pages 11-70, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    10. Heemeijer, Peter & Hommes, Cars & Sonnemans, Joep & Tuinstra, Jan, 2009. "Price stability and volatility in markets with positive and negative expectations feedback: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 1052-1072, May.
    11. Bao, Te & Duffy, John, 2016. "Adaptive versus eductive learning: Theory and evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 64-89.
    12. Koriyama, Yukio & Ozkes, Ali I., 2021. "Inclusive cognitive hierarchy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 458-480.
    13. Eizo Akiyama & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Ryuichiro Ishikawa, 2017. "It is Not Just Confusion! Strategic Uncertainty in An Experimental Asset Market," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(605), pages 563-580, October.
    14. Anufriev, Mikhail & Duffy, John & Panchenko, Valentyn, 2022. "Learning in two-dimensional beauty contest games: Theory and experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    15. Nobuyuki Hanaki & Angela Sutan & Marc Willinger, 2016. "The Strategic Environment Effect in Beauty Contest Games," GREDEG Working Papers 2016-05, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis.
    16. Zafer Akin, 2023. "Asymmetric guessing games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 94(4), pages 637-676, May.
    17. Wright, James R. & Leyton-Brown, Kevin, 2017. "Predicting human behavior in unrepeated, simultaneous-move games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 16-37.
    18. Ernst Fehr & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2008. "Limited Rationality and Strategic Interaction: The Impact of the Strategic Environment on Nominal Inertia," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(2), pages 353-394, March.
    19. Hommes, Cars, 2018. "Behavioral & experimental macroeconomics and policy analysis: a complex systems approach," Working Paper Series 2201, European Central Bank.
    20. Bao, Te & Hommes, Cars, 2019. "When speculators meet suppliers: Positive versus negative feedback in experimental housing markets," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 1-1.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lam:wpaper:03-16. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Patricia Modat (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/lamplfr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.