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Responders versus Non-responders: A New Perspective on Heterogeneity

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  • Haltiwanger, John
  • Waldman, Michael

Abstract

This paper considers the implications of a particular type of heterogeneity--one which characterizes a large number of economic environments, but that has not received any systematic treatment in the literature. The authors refer to this heterogeneity as responders versus nonresponders. The paper begins by providing a general framework for the analysis of environments characterized by this heterogeneity and then shows how this framework can be used to help understand a wide variety of economic environments. Particular applications considered are, near rationality, network externalities, and models of reputation. Copyright 1991 by Royal Economic Society.

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  • Haltiwanger, John & Waldman, Michael, 1991. "Responders versus Non-responders: A New Perspective on Heterogeneity," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(408), pages 1085-1102, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:101:y:1991:i:408:p:1085-1102
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    2. Jan Potters & Sigrid Suetens, 2009. "Cooperation in Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(3), pages 1125-1147.
    3. Bomfim, Antulio N & Diebold, Francis X, 1997. "Bonded Rationality and Strategic Complementarity in a Macroeconomic Model: Policy Effects, Persistence and Multipliers," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(444), pages 1358-1374, September.
    4. Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Koriyama, Yukio & Sutan, Angela & Willinger, Marc, 2019. "The strategic environment effect in beauty contest games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 587-610.
    5. Nachane, Dilip & Ghosh, Saibal & Ray, Partha, 2006. "Basel II and bank lending behavior: some likely implications for monetary policy," MPRA Paper 3841, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Hopfensitz, Astrid & Wranik, Tanja, 2008. "Psychological and environmental determinants of myopic loss aversion," MPRA Paper 9305, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Karla Hoff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2004. "After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Societies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 753-763, June.
    8. Bayar, Tumennasan & Cornett, Marcia Millon & Erhemjamts, Otgontsetseg & Leverty, Ty & Tehranian, Hassan, 2018. "An examination of the relation between strategic interaction among industry firms and firm performance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 248-263.
    9. Ayse Gül Mermer & Wieland Müller & Sigrid Suetens, 2016. "Cooperation in Indefinitely Repeated Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes," Vienna Economics Papers 1603, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    10. Nobuyuki Hanaki, 2020. "Cognitive ability and observed behavior in laboratory experiments: implications for macroeconomic theory," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(3), pages 355-378, July.
    11. Carlos Viana de Carvalho, 2004. "The Effects of Heterogeneity in Price Setting on Price and Inflation Inertia," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 9, Econometric Society.
    12. Olivier Coibion & Yuriy Gorodnichenko, 2011. "Strategic Interaction among Heterogeneous Price-Setters in an Estimated DSGE Model," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 93(3), pages 920-940, August.
    13. Nachane, Dilip & Ghosh, Saibal & Ray, Partha, 2006. "Basel II and bank lending behavior: Some likely implications for monetary policy in India," MPRA Paper 3840, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Felipe Schwartzman & Carlos Carvalho, 2008. "Heterogeneous Price Setting Behavior and Monetary Non-neutrality: Some General Results," 2008 Meeting Papers 1040, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    15. Carvalho Carlos, 2006. "Heterogeneity in Price Stickiness and the Real Effects of Monetary Shocks," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(3), pages 1-58, December.
    16. Yuriy Gorodnichenko & Michael Weber, 2016. "Are Sticky Prices Costly? Evidence from the Stock Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(1), pages 165-199, January.
    17. Heyes, Anthony, 2001. "Honesty in a regulatory context - good thing or bad?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 215-232, February.
    18. Hoff, Karla & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 2005. "The creation of the rule of law and the legitimacy of property rights : the political and economic consequences of a corrupt privatization," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3779, The World Bank.
    19. Carlos Carvalho, 2005. "Heterogeneity in Price Setting and the Real Effects of Monetary Shocks," Macroeconomics 0509017, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Oct 2005.
    20. Weder, Mark, 2004. "Near-rational expectations in animal spirits models of aggregate fluctuations," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 249-265, March.
    21. W D A Bryant, 2009. "General Equilibrium:Theory and Evidence," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number 6875, September.
    22. S. Zamagni, 1994. "Economia e filosofia," Working Papers 184, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    23. Baglioni, Angelo, 2007. "Monetary policy transmission under different banking structures: The role of capital and heterogeneity," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 78-100.
    24. Paul Oslington, 2012. "General Equilibrium: Theory and Evidence," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 88(282), pages 446-448, September.

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