IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/qjecon/v103y1988i3p441-463..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models

Author

Listed:
  • Russell Cooper
  • Andrew John

Abstract

This paper focuses on the importance of strategic complementarities in agents' payoff functions as a basis for macroeconomic coordination failures. Strategic complementarities arise when the optimal strategy of an agent depends positively upon the strategies of the other agents. We first analyze an abstract game and find that multiple equilibria and a multiplier process may arise when strategic complementarities are present. Often these equilibria can be Pareto ranked. We then place additional economic content on the analysis of this game by considering strategic complementarities arising from production functions, matching technologies, and commodity demand functions in a multisector, imperfectly competitive economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Russell Cooper & Andrew John, 1988. "Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 103(3), pages 441-463.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:103:y:1988:i:3:p:441-463.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/1885539
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Diamond, Peter A, 1982. "Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 881-894, October.
    2. Weitzman, Martin L, 1982. "Increasing Returns and the Foundations of Unemployment Theory," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 92(368), pages 787-804, December.
    3. Jean-Pascal Benassy, 1975. "Neo-Keynesian Disequilibrium Theory in a Monetary Economy," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(4), pages 503-523.
    4. John Bryant, 1983. "A Simple Rational Expectations Keynes-type Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 525-528.
    5. Oliver Hart, 1982. "A Model of Imperfect Competition with Keynesian Features," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 97(1), pages 109-138.
    6. Jeremy I. Bulow & John Geanakoplos & Paul D. Klemperer, 1983. "Multimarket Oligopoly," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 674, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:103:y:1988:i:3:p:441-463.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.