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Funzionamento del mercato del lavoro in presenza di informazione asimmetrica. Una rassegna della letteratura

  • Canegallo, Claudia


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    Il problema dell'informazione asimmetrica nel mercato del lavoro e' stato affrontato ripercorrendo la letteratura relativa agli sviluppi dei modelli di salari di efficienza, nelle varie categorie di selezione avversa, azzardo morale e segnalazione. Per ognuna di queste categorie sono stati ripercorsi gli sviluppi piu' recenti e le applicazioni piu' specifiche, con una particolare attenzione nei confronti dei contributi che hanno cercato di trovare un collegamento fra le varie categorie di informazione asimmetrica. Piu' problematico e' risultato ricondurre i temi dell'informazione asimmetrica all'ambito macroeconomico della New Keynesian Economics. A parte qualche recentissimo contributo in tal senso, non vi e' ancora stata una risposta definitiva in grado di quantificare se e quanta parte della disoccupazione esistente sia riconducibile alla presenza di informazione asimmetrica nel mercato del lavoro. In questo campo, gli sviluppi possibili sono ancora molto numerosi.

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    Paper provided by Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS in its series POLIS Working Papers with number 8.

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    Length: 39 pages
    Date of creation: Nov 1999
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:uca:ucapdv:8
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    1. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1973. "Approaches to the Economics of Discrimination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 287-95, May.
    2. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1984. "Theories of Wage Rigidity," NBER Working Papers 1442, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Andrew Weiss, 1995. "Human Capital vs. Signalling Explanations of Wages," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 133-154, Fall.
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