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Funzionamento del mercato del lavoro in presenza di informazione asimmetrica. Una rassegna della letteratura

Listed author(s):
  • Canegallo, Claudia

    ()

Registered author(s):

    Il problema dell'informazione asimmetrica nel mercato del lavoro e' stato affrontato ripercorrendo la letteratura relativa agli sviluppi dei modelli di salari di efficienza, nelle varie categorie di selezione avversa, azzardo morale e segnalazione. Per ognuna di queste categorie sono stati ripercorsi gli sviluppi piu' recenti e le applicazioni piu' specifiche, con una particolare attenzione nei confronti dei contributi che hanno cercato di trovare un collegamento fra le varie categorie di informazione asimmetrica. Piu' problematico e' risultato ricondurre i temi dell'informazione asimmetrica all'ambito macroeconomico della New Keynesian Economics. A parte qualche recentissimo contributo in tal senso, non vi e' ancora stata una risposta definitiva in grado di quantificare se e quanta parte della disoccupazione esistente sia riconducibile alla presenza di informazione asimmetrica nel mercato del lavoro. In questo campo, gli sviluppi possibili sono ancora molto numerosi.

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    File URL: http://polis.unipmn.it/pubbl/RePEc/uca/ucapdv/claudia.pdf
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    Paper provided by Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS in its series POLIS Working Papers with number 8.

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    Length: 39 pages
    Date of creation: Nov 1999
    Handle: RePEc:uca:ucapdv:8
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://polis.unipmn.it

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