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Compensation Methods in Competitive Labor Markets

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Paper provided by Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines in its series ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers with number inv118.

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Handle: RePEc:ila:ilades:inv118
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  1. Bester, Helmut, 1985. "Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 850-55, September.
  2. Edward P. Lazear & Paul Oyer, 2007. "Personnel Economics," NBER Working Papers 13480, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
  4. Saha, Atanu, 1997. "Risk Preference Estimation in the Nonlinear Mean Standard Deviation Approach," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(4), pages 770-82, October.
  5. Rosenthal, Robert W & Weiss, Andrew, 1984. "Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium in a Market with Asymmetric Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(2), pages 333-42, April.
  6. Kaplan, Steven N, 1994. "Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the United States," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 510-46, June.
  7. Foster, Andrew D & Rosenzweig, Mark R, 1996. "Comparative Advantage, Information and the Allocation of Workers to Tasks: Evidence from an Agricultural Labour Market," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(3), pages 347-74, July.
  8. repec:tpr:qjecon:v:109:y:1994:i:4:p:921-55 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
  10. Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1990. "Relative performance evaluation for chief executive officers," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 43(3), pages 30-51, February.
  11. Hellwig,Martin, 1986. "Some recent developments in the theory of competition in markets with adverse selection," Discussion Paper Serie A 82, University of Bonn, Germany.
  12. repec:tpr:qjecon:v:109:y:1994:i:4:p:881-919 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Christopher Ferrall, 1997. "Empirical Analysis of Occupational Hierarchies," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 32(1), pages 1-34.
  14. Edward P. Lazear, 1996. "Performance Pay and Productivity," NBER Working Papers 5672, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. W. Bentley MacLeod & Daniel Parent, 1998. "Job Characteristics and the Form of Compensation," CIRANO Working Papers 98s-08, CIRANO.
  16. Rey, Patrick & Salanie, Bernard, 1996. "On the Value of Commitment with Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1395-1414, November.
  17. Barry Nalebuff & Andres Rodriguez & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1993. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Screening Device," NBER Working Papers 4357, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Jean-Jacques LAFFONT & Jean TIROLE, 1990. "Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 9005, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  19. Gibbs, Michael, 1995. "Incentive compensation in a corporate hierarchy," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2-3), pages 247-277, April.
  20. Wolf, Charles & Pohlman, Larry, 1983. "The Recovery of Risk Preferences from Actual Choices," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(3), pages 843-50, May.
  21. Mailath George J. & Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1993. "Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 241-276, August.
  22. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1987. "The Causes and Consequences of the Dependence of Quality on Price," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(1), pages 1-48, March.
  23. Canice Prendergast, 1996. "What Happens Within Firms? A Survey of Empirical Evidence on Compensation Policies," NBER Working Papers 5802, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  24. Murphy, Kevin J., 1985. "Corporate performance and managerial remuneration : An empirical analysis," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 11-42, April.
  25. Charles Brown, 1989. "Firms' Choice of Method of Pay," NBER Working Papers 3065, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  26. repec:tpr:qjecon:v:90:y:1976:i:4:p:630-49 is not listed on IDEAS
  27. Robert W Drago & John S. Heywood, 1995. "The Choice of Payment Schemes: Australian Establishment Data," Working papers _006, University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee.
  28. Petersen, Trond, 1991. "Reward Systems and the Distribution of Wages," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 130-58, Special I.
  29. Andrew Weiss, 1995. "Human Capital vs. Signalling Explanations of Wages," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 133-154, Fall.
  30. repec:tpr:qjecon:v:102:y:1987:i:2:p:179-221 is not listed on IDEAS
  31. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1997. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 896, David K. Levine.
  32. Andrew D. Foster & Mark R. Rosenzweig, 1993. "Information, Learning, and Wage Rates in Low-Income Rural Areas," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 28(4), pages 759-790.
  33. Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J., 1988. "Performance Pay And Top Management Incentives," Papers 88-04, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
  34. repec:tpr:qjecon:v:106:y:1991:i:1:p:255-75 is not listed on IDEAS
  35. Blanchflower, David G & Oswald, Andrew J, 1988. "Profit-Related Pay: Prose Discovered," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(392), pages 720-30, September.
  36. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre & Salanie, Bernard, 1997. "Empirical contract theory: The case of insurance data," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 943-950, April.
  37. Biglaiser Gary & Mezzetti Claudio, 1993. "Principals Competing for an Agent in the Presence of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 302-330, December.
  38. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
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