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Tenure, Wage Profiles and Monitoring

  • Sessions, John G.

    ()

    (University of Bath)

  • Theodoropoulos, Nikolaos

    ()

    (University of Cyprus)

We investigate the relationship between the slope of the wage-tenure profile and the level of monitoring across two cross sections of matched employer-employee British data. Our theoretical model predicts that increased monitoring leads to a decline in the slope of the wage-tenure profile. Our empirical analysis provides strong support for this prediction.

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Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 3307.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3307
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